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In recent years, Denmark and the West in general have experienced an increase in the terrorist threat.
As regards Denmark, this threat became specific last summer when the Danish Embassy in Islamabad was hit by a terrorist attack. On 02 June, a white Toyota Corolla going very fast drove up to the Embassy where it jammed the brakes and was subsequently brought to explosion approximately 5 meters from the Embassy entrance.
In this suicide attack, both locally employed officers from the Embassy as well as visitors were killed by the powerful car bomb.
Immediately following this attack, several officers from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service travelled to Pakistan to assist in the investigation. Shortly after, one more officer followed. The task of this employee was of a very specific nature - to improve security for the Danish officers at the Embassy, both in relation to the physical protection of the Embassy buildings and the personal security of the embassy staff.
In September 2008, this particular officer was killed during a violent and cowardly terrorist attack against the Islamabad Marriott Hotel. To us in the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, his death constitutes a most tangible reminder of the situation that Denmark and a number of other countries are facing right now.
We, on our part, say that today there is a general terrorist threat against Denmark which is strengthened by militant extremist groups' increased focus on Denmark and Danish interests as a target of a terrorist act.
Not least the cartoons of the Prophet that were published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 have resulted in an increased focus being brought on Denmark and Danish interests as a terrorist target among leading militant extremists abroad. A reprint of these cartoons in February 2008 has increased this focus even more and this means that among these militant extremists there is a desire to carry out terrorist attacks specifically aimed at Denmark, Danish nationals and Danish interests outside Denmark.
Most recently, the leader of al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, condemned these cartoons in March 2008. In September last year, al-Qaida also published a long video that dealt with the cartoons and the suicide attack, for instance, against the Danish Embassy in Pakistan on 02 June 2008.
Especially the reprint of the cartoons of the Prophet is used by al-Qaida, both ideologically and for propaganda purposes. Statements from leading al-Qaida members underline that al-Qaida has a strategic focus on Denmark and contributes to maintaining militant extremists' focus on Denmark and Danish interests.
The terrorist threat mainly comes from networks, groups and individuals who adhere to various forms of militant Islamist ideology. For instance, this applies to al-Qaida related groups and networks in Denmark and abroad.
Experience from recent years has shown that a considerable and increasing part of the militant extremists are young men born and raised in the West. They are the ones that we call "home-grown terrorists".
These persons are not necessarily deeply rooted in a specific conflict area but rather see themselves as part of a worldwide Muslim community which is being attacked.
The so-called home-grown terrorists often form part of networks that provide a social function to each of its members, and the radicalisation processes often take place within such networks.
Networks of home-grown extremists are usually characterised by being loosely structured and composed of young individuals, typically between 16 and 25 years old who are born or raised in Denmark. Some of these individuals are in contact with militant groups or persons abroad.
To this should be added that there are examples that persons from Denmark have travelled to conflict areas worldwide where they have participated in militant training or actual combats against international military presence and local authorities. What worries the Danish Security and Intelligence Service and our partners is, naturally, that there is a risk that these persons return to Denmark and use their skills in connection with terrorist related activities in Denmark.
In addition, we can see that there are persons and networks in Denmark who contribute to the financing of terrorist groups and terrorist activities abroad and who are involved in the recruitment of young Muslim men who are sent to Iran and Afghanistan to participate in acts of terrorism in these countries.
To an increasing extent, the Internet is used by terrorist groups and terrorist networks for communication purposes, training, logistic support and operational planning and preparation.
There is no doubt that the capacity to carry out a terrorist attack with relatively simple means is present in Denmark and that certain circles possess a will to carry out a terrorist attack. This is for instance underlined by several terrorist cases in recent years where various persons have been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for terrorist activities.
Even though police and security authorities are working round the clock to uncover, unravel and prevent terrorist attacks, these might take place without prior intelligence indications being present, that is without warning. This can be learnt for instance from the Madrid attacks in 2004 and the London attacks in 2005.
As a modus, the terrorists typically use homemade bombs to carry out their attacks. However, the most recent development seems to indicate that larger bombs with a substantial blast effect are increasingly used. This means that also relatively protected targets could risk being attacked. We saw this, for instance, in connection with the terrorist attack against the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in September last year.
Terrorists have also used other modi in relation to terrorist attacks, including hand weapons and abductions. We see that terrorist groups are constantly seeking to learn from previous attacks and to develop new and surprising types of attacks that are difficult to predict. That was the case of the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008.
We can see that terrorists often target public transportation. This is due, not least, to the fact that this is an easily accessible target where a lot of people are gathered. Furthermore, attacks against public transportation and traffic hubs have a psychological effect on the public since these are locations where large segments of the population come regularly and therefore may see themselves as potential victims. We have also seen examples of simple attacks against targets with an obvious symbolic or political value.
Outside Denmark's frontiers, in certain areas, there is a considerable and recognised terrorist threat against Danish nationals and Danish interests, not least in areas where persons or interests can be immediately identified as Danish. In particular, this is the case in regions where al-Qaida and al-Qaida related groups have gained a foothold, for instance in North Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan and as we, accordingly, saw manifesting itself in proper acts of terrorism as with the case of the attack against the Danish Embassy in Islamabad in June last year.
In my view, terrorist related abductions are a phenomenon that we should pay even more attention to. Several abduction cases within the last year have shown that there is a considerable risk of abductions taking place in various regions all over the world. In particularly, this is the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan and certain places in the Middle East and North and Africa. It is our assessment that targeted abductions, of Danish nationals also, could be initiated by militant extremist groups, not only following the cartoons of the Prophet but also in order to gain prestige and recognition within the al-Qaida leadership. And to repeat what I said in my introduction - a Dane is a Dane or a Dutch is a Dutch, no matter if he is employed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a private company.
Although the terrorist threat to Denmark and several other countries is the most serious one at present, there are various other forms of threats that companies and authorities should decide how to act upon. These are e.g. espionage, including industrial espionage, and organized crime. This multiple threat environment is not just something that the police must handle. It also involves threats that the companies must give careful consideration to when they organise their security.
The objective of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service is to monitor, prevent and counter undertakings and acts which are presumed to present a threat to the independence and safety of the lawful order of the Danish society. This means that the Danish Security and Intelligence Service is constantly accomplishing operations directed to identifying and preventing specific terrorist threats in Denmark and abroad.
In addition to intensive efforts in respect of investigation and intelligence, in my view, there is a number of necessary tasks to be carried out if we are to handle the terrorist threat that we are facing.
First of all, it is essential to realise that the prevention of security related threats is not a task that police and security authorities can solve on their own. Therefore, it is an important objective of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service to involve the whole society in order to protect the values that our society is built upon. Likewise, through advice, it is important to contribute to the establishment of an efficient and robust preparedness that can stand up to the threats that we are confronted with.
Furthermore, it is important that we do everything we can to prevent the radicalisation that makes young people adhere to violent means and become ready to carry out acts of terrorism.
Consequently, we are working specifically to develop and implement concrete initiatives to prevent radicalisation in Denmark. The most important element in our effort within this field is our attempt to make all relevant authorities, players and organisations participate in this effort.
As part of our efforts to activate all sectors of society in our efforts against radicalisation, we have, therefore, set up a special dialogue group through which we attempt to strengthen and expand our dialogue with representatives of ethnic minorities and religious representatives.
The necessary condition for entering into a dialogue with the Danish Security and Intelligence Service is not that we agree on everything. We believe that is important that we should also have a dialogue with some of those who represent more controversial views. It is obvious, though, that there is a limit to those with whom we have a dialogue; this limit is drawn at people who adhere to violent and military extremism.
In recent years, communication has been placed on the agenda as an important element in the fight against terrorism; terrorists do no only fight a violent battle. Largely, they also fight a battle of words through which they try to put forward a distinct view of the world and a conflict of interests between western societies and Muslims.
We can see that terrorists attempt to justify and legitimate their acts by using a religious way of talking. For this reason, it is very important that we understand that we are also in the middle of a propaganda war that makes demands as to how we communicate and that militant Islamists handle this task extremely professionally.
You may see this for yourself by watching the video that al-Qaida published following the terrorist attack against the Danish Embassy in Islamabad.
The video lasts for an hour and, believe me; it has not been produced in a cave up in the mountains; It is the result of a highly professional communicative effort that al-Qaida has approached efficiently and with surpassing skills.
Therefore, it is important that we all communicate precisely when it comes to terrorism.
It is important that we do NOT play the terrorists' game. We should NOT start using the terms that the terrorists would like us to use. Moreover, it is important that we do NOT communicate in a way that, in reality, confirms the religious legitimacy and the view of the world that the terrorists are seeking to put forward. This is exactly why the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, just this week, held a conference on this subject, a conference where both Danish and international experts contributed to the debates.
In other words, communication does have a significant impact on the current threat and therefore plays a key role in the battle for the hearts and minds in our effort to undermine terrorist networks. And we must bear in mind that this battle is being fought in a globalized media environment where the way we talk about terrorism in for instance Denmark or Switzerland is likely to go around the world in a matter of minutes.
Apart from communicating precisely, it is also important to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service that we constantly try to adapt our work methods and the way we handle the threat to the threat picture at any given time.
The threat picture we are currently facing means that we - to a much greater extent - have to relate to a threat aimed at Danish embassies, Danish companies and Danish citizens abroad.
The consequence is that we, to a much higher degree, must be prepared for working abroad and for co-operating with foreign authorities in order to protect Danish interests.
That is why the Danish Security and Intelligence Service has decided to strengthen its operational capacity abroad and why an international security team is established now.
The international security team will consist of staff members who - for shorter or longer periods - can be deployed as security advisers to Danish diplomatic representations, for example if the threat against a Danish embassy increases suddenly and significantly. In this connection the job of the deployed staff members is to increase the security related to the threat that has occurred - partly through specific security and investigational measures and partly through a co-operation with the local authorities.
Along with the establishment of the international security team we also intend to expand our security advising to Danish authorities and Danish companies to also include security related issues abroad. The security advising will, in particular, concern physical security, information security and staff security.
The expansion of our security advising to Danish authorities and companies is to supplement the already existing security advising. Since 2003, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service has had several contact groups, and in 2008 we further streamlined this concept so that today the Danish Security and Intelligence Service runs one transverse dialogue group. The very fact that we have gathered the public and private actors in one transverse dialogue group is an expression of how the Danish Security and Intelligence Service does not distinguish between public and private when it comes to the security related threats we face today.
The purpose of this forum is to increase the overall resistance of society against security related threats, including terrorism, the spreading of weapons of mass destruction, extremism and espionage. In this forum various companies and authorities receive generally oriented advice, and the goal is to encourage a transverse security culture among the various actors.
This does not mean that the Danish Security and Intelligence Service can and must advise all companies and authorities. We are, first and foremost, an intelligence service. However, we do try to offer specific advice in order to reduce the vulnerability of the critical national infrastructure when it comes to terrorism and espionage. What we as an intelligence service are able to offer is to create a framework which the companies and authorities can use in their security related work. This also means that we do not regard the intelligence service as a competitor to the many private security companies that already offer valuable advice.
I will now turn to the more general security related implications of the terrorist threat when it comes to private companies and organisations. And finally, I will dare make an attempt at some more general recommendations regarding crisis handling even if I know that this is an area where one has to be at one's best to teach this expert assembly anything.
And this makes me repeat what I said at the beginning: terrorist attacks do not distinguish between governmental and private casualties!
The overall objective of terrorists is, among others, to destabilize the legal order of society and create fear and distrust in the governments and the law makers of the western countries and the decision makers, thus trying to force through certain actions or even clear the way for a political and religious change of system.
Precisely because terrorists typically focus on this issue, it is often the misunderstanding that terrorism solely concerns government institutions and public authorities.
But terrorism - and not least a terrorist attack -has a huge impact on large parts of society and which can result in a number of serious derived effects - also for private companies and organizations.
A terrorist attack against, for example, the bus or train traffic will cause a panic which could easily spread to other parts of the transport sector. A terrorist attack that hits the energy sector might cause completely immeasurable consumer reactions which will put a long row of other industries under various forms of pressure. An attack against the financial sector might potentially make the consumers loose faith in the stock market - again with many consequences for the companies. Add to this the risk of industrial espionage which is not just a threat against state safety but may also have major consequences for the earnings and, ultimately, the survival of the companies.
On top of all this one must also take into account the effect of the political reactions following a terror attack - these may very easily result in major consequences for the private sector.
Therefore, it is important that the companies cerate a robust emergency response plan which is able to act efficiently and swiftly in case a crisis situation occurs, both for the sake of the companies themselves and also - as I said earlier - because a security aware and robust private sector is a very important part of society's overall resistance. Both when it comes to preventing terrorist acts and when the aftermath of a terrorist attack is to be handled efficiently.
Add to this that an efficient emergency response plan does, of course, not only deal with terrorism, espionage and extremism. Today, companies face a broad spectrum of threats ranging all the way from climate changes and natural disasters to the kidnapping of employees with the purpose of blackmailing these companies.
My recommendation is, therefore, that the companies - and the company leaders in particular - must take the planning of an emergency response even more seriously. Of course, I know that I do not have to mention it to this competent assembly, and that is also why I stress that it is the responsibility of the company leaders to lift this task.
In order to establish an efficient emergency response plan, it is absolutely central that this task is solidly rooted in the top management, that the management is committed to and favours the preparation and exercises, and that the management leads the way with a good example. Because while a deliberate security culture must come from the top of the organisation, it is often the employees who must make it happen. And the employees will pick up on it immediately if the management is sending signals which can be interpreted as if security issues are not to be taken seriously. It is, therefore, important that a point is made of emergency response plans and security measures that agreed policies and rules are enforced, and that any breach of these will have consequences.
It is also crucial that the emergency response plans that are drawn up are both simple and robust. And it is also important that they are based on daily routines.
We are impelled to make detailed emergency response plans because they create the illusion that we - as a company or organization - are able to plan for everything. But this is unrealistic. And when an emergency situation then occurs, the detailed crisis plan will seem impossible to get an overall view of. This will limit independent thinking and vital improvisation which are so important when it really counts.
One of the most frequently used clichés is "Practice makes perfect". But as is the case with many other clichés, it has become so popular simply because it is true. And that practice makes perfect is especially true when it comes to crisis management.
The emergency response plans should be tested and carried out as exercises - not just once in a while but on a regular basis so that they are firmly fixed in the heads of the employees and, at best, become instinctive reactions.
Exercises often seem abstract to the employees. It is, therefore, important to implement the emergency response plans in connection with real but minor crises even though they were originally intended to be a worst case scenario. Thus, the company is better prepared during major crises.
As you know crises often develop in an unpredictable manner and they may become very prolonged. That is why an important part of the emergency response plan must be the establishment of an "emergency crisis staff" which means that the crisis staff can be replaced along the road so that those who are to make the decisions, do not get tired out.
As important as it is to have a good emergency response plan it is equally important to prevent internal threats against the security of the company.
When companies and authorities are to hire new employees they, first and foremost, look for the applicant who is best qualified for the job. In such a situation there are all too many who do not take the security aspect into consideration.
Still, it is a sound investment to think about security when hiring employees who are to have access to research results, business strategies, security and emergency response plans or other forms of sensitive or confidential material, for example, at an airport or within the chemical or medical industry.
Mapping out the background of the applicant will reduce the risk of letting individuals into the organization who may illegally attempt to gather and pass on information which can be used for terror or espionage purposes. Among other things, this can be done by taking a closer look at the credibility of the applicant and by focusing on the applicant's integrity and personal stress limit during the actual job interview.
I also want to mention the risk of contributing towards the spreading of products or knowledge that can be used in connection with chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons.
At least 20 countries have developed or are suspected of attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction. These countries are mainly concentrated in the Middle East, North Africa and South and South East Asia. These countries see the possession of weapons of mass destruction as essential to their national security interests.
Therefore, the companies must be especially aware when they are in contact with partners in countries that are suspected of attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction. This is particularly the case when looking at the export of products that can be used within both a civilian and a military context - the so-called dual-use products.
Attempts will often be made to buy such products indirectly via front companies and middlemen in order to cover up who the actual user of the products is. And it is not just countries but also terrorist networks that may be active within this area.
In order to limit the risk of becoming an accessory to the spreading of products that can be used for weapons of mass destruction, it is essential that companies and research institutes have an actual export control policy. That means a clear internal distribution of responsibility, fixed procedures for the handling of export control cases and awareness when it comes to countries that are sensitive in relation to export control.
Security, as you all know, costs money. And there is a constant need to ensure efficiency.
Therefore I call for "intelligent security" as another cornerstone of building efficient emergency response plans. They must be based on real-time threat assessments and thorough analyses of vulnerability. Generally speaking, we cannot protect everything all the time, so we need to know which of our vulnerabilities are critical and likely to be targeted.
Furthermore, our emergency response plans must be flexible and adjustable, not only in order to be quickly adaptable to changes in current threat levels, but also to be cost-efficient.
I have made a point today of stressing the importance of acknowledging especially the relevance of the terrorist threat to private companies. But I would like to make one final point by emphasizing that threats against private companies can also pose serious threats to national security. That is particularly true when we talk about industrial espionage where for instance the theft of advanced technology may cause a shift in the balance of power between nations.
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