Danish efforts against terrorism

Denmark and the rest of the Western World have experienced an increasing terrorist threat in recent years, and it is currently the assessment that a general terrorist threat against Denmark exists.

The terrorist threat against Denmark mainly originates from networks, groups, and individuals who subscribe to various forms of militant Islamist ideology.

Terrorist attacks may occur without there being any prior intelligence related indications i.e. without warning. This has been the experience not least in connection with the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 which also illustrate that it is possible to cause quite severe damages through the use of materials that are easily accessible.

Complex and spectacular attacks depend on considerable resources and networks seen in relation to e.g. logistics and they will often be difficult to carry out. On the other hand it is possible to carry out less complicated attacks using more common means with less preparation, fewer resources and smaller networks and they, therefore, require special attention from the authorities.

It is PET’s assessment that the Danish participation in the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the Cartoon Controversy to a certain extent has contributed towards increasing the awareness of Denmark as a potential target of terrorist attacks within militant extremist circles. 

No unequivocal profile exists of individuals who are radicalised and subsequently recruited for terrorism.

However, the experiences from recent years in both Denmark and other European countries show that a substantial and growing number of the militant extremists belong to the group of younger or very young men who have been born and raised in the West.

These so-called “home-grown” extremists have often gone through a quick radicalisation process where the Internet, established extremist ideologies and charismatic figures combined with friends and personal networks typically have played an important part. These individuals are not necessarily deeply rooted in a specific conflict area; they rather see themselves as part of a worldwide Muslim community which – in their eyes – is under attack. 

The increased counter-terrorism efforts of the authorities mean that in recent years it has become more difficult to hit high-profile protected targets. At the same time one of the means preferred by terrorists are attacks launched against unprotected locations with large crowds in order to cause as much damage as possible. However, there are also examples of attacks against targets with a clear symbolic or political aim as was the case with the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands.

Attacks on public means of transport are often preferred by terrorists. This is especially due to the fact that they are easy access targets with many people in close proximity of each other and because such an attack will have a huge psychological effect on the public.

In the Western World there are relatively few examples of terrorists seeing critical infrastructure as a target in itself.

Terrorists typically use improvised or homemade bombs which can be made fairly easily from materials that can easily be required.

However, at the same time it is apparent that terrorist groups are constantly trying to develop new, surprising and thus hard to predict forms of attack.

With regard to Danes travelling abroad it is the general assessment that they are no more exposed to terrorist attacks than others. The primary risk of Danes being attacked abroad is due to the fact that they typically go to places where other Westerners are also staying and that terrorists may focus on such places as possible targets.

However, the exposure of Denmark in connection with its participation in the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the Cartoon Controversy may have the result that there could be a higher risk of obvious Danish targets being threatened by terrorist attacks compared to a number of other countries.

Al-Qaida plays a central role within international terrorism.

The military intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks on 11 September 2001 meant that Al-Qaida’s central leadership and organisation was moved to Pakistan and the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. From these locations Al-Qaida has been able to regain its role as the standard-bearer of militant Sunni extremism, and it has gradually rebuilt its ability to single out targets and plan terrorist attacks abroad.

Thus, there are three different types of Al-Qaida today. The first is the leadership and core organisation in Pakistan, next there is the global network of Al-Qaida related terrorist groups, and finally there are networks of extremists in e.g. Europe who identify with the Al-Qaida ideology and who – to a varying extent – are in contact with other Al-Qaida related groups, networks or persons.

As previously mentioned a significant and increasing number of militant extremists are young men who have been born and raised in the West and who have gone through a radicalisation process.

Within this context the term radicalisation is to be understood as a process during which a person increasingly accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means in order to reach a specific ideological goal.

However, radicalisation is not solely an Islamist phenomenon. It also takes place within other extremist circles, including certain political circles.

The so-called home-grown extremists are often part of networks that hold some sort of social function for the individual, and the radicalisation processes often take place within such networks.

Networks of home-grown extremists are often characterised by being loosely structured and consisting of young people typically between the ages of 16 and 25 who were born and raised in Denmark. The young often see themselves as part of a global Islamist network which – in many cases – has a political agenda where violence plays a central role.

It is often both local and global problems which these networks relate to. This means that international incidents may have an impact on the actions and ideological conviction of these groups. It also entails that the networks are inspired by famous Islamist ideologists whose messages are placed on Islamist websites.

On one hand, the networks can be very closed when it comes to the organisation of their activities and they meet secretly in private. On the other hand, the networks are often also very outspoken when it comes to spreading their messages and they sometimes appear to act very moralising towards their other acquaintances with regard to religious conduct.

There are often many and complex motivating factors that make a person subscribe to radical Islamist messages. It may be social and cultural issues such as identity problems, dissociation from the parents and religious observance. It may also involve conflicts with the established religious leaders who traditionally have been preaching primarily about topics related to the Middle East, Asia, or Africa and who therefore are seen by some as being unable to relate to the surrounding Western World in which the young people live.

The networks may be made up by persons with either the same ethnic origin or across ethnic backgrounds, including young people who have converted to Islam. Often there is no distinct hierarchic structure, but usually one person within the group has a higher status e.g. because of his knowledge of Islam just as the individual members often have different roles without these necessarily being well-defined.

Within a network the radicalisation process is often promoted by a radicaliser who offers advice on religious and political matters. The radicaliser is usually a person who is in direct contact with individuals going through the radicalisation process. However, the contact may also be more indirect e.g. via the Internet.

There are examples of a radicaliser actively recruiting a person who can be indoctrinated to become part of or support a terrorist network or group. A radicaliser may choose a person with special competencies according to whether the target person is to be used for actively participating in a terrorist attack or in support functions.

There are also examples of how persons, who are susceptible to radical views, play an active part themselves and seek out the radicaliser. With regard to users of the Internet this can manifest itself in visits to certain websites where questions and enquiries related to religious and political topics are answered by more or less self-proclaimed religious authorities. 

The radicalisation will typically be divided into phases. During the first phase contact is made with a radicaliser while the following phases will show a change in the behavioural patterns of the radicalised persons who will also become more and more isolated and hardened in order to make them ready for participation in actual terrorist acts.

The radicalisation process will often be characterised by strong group dynamics but there are also a few examples of what can be described as self-radicalisation which usually happens through the use of websites and chat forums on the Internet.

If a person suddenly changes behaviour and very quickly starts seeing himself as deeply religious and if this person begins to express extremist viewpoints these may be signs that the person in question is going through a radicalisation process.

Particular attention must therefore be given to such quick changes in the appearance and behaviour of a person.

Religious observance is a central feature in Islamist extremists who generally see themselves as deeply religious. But a strong religious observance is not in itself a sufficient indicator of radicalisation as the vast majority of deeply religious Muslims do not sympathise with militant extremists. Similarly a number of the Islamist extremists often only has a superficial relationship to Islam and focus more on the political rather than the religious aspects.

An indication of a radicalisation process taking place may be a rapidly increasing or changing religious observance. Another indication may be that the person in question all of a sudden becomes condemnatory towards the lacking or “erroneous” religious observance of others.

Certain types of clothing or beards are often used by religious Muslim men and in most cases they have nothing to do with radicalisation. But several times changes in style of clothing and physical appearance have been an indication of changed and radicalised behaviour. Thus, it is the change in the style of clothing which is interesting as an indication of radicalisation in the early stages – not the style of clothing itself.

On the other hand there are also examples of how extremists – in order to avoid attention – consciously have tried to appear Western and secular in the time immediately before a terrorist act. This was e.g. the case with the perpetrators of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.

Other changes in a persons appearance and behaviour that may also be indications of a radicalisation process are an increasing and self-elected isolation from the persons usual circle of acquaintances, change of names, altered travel activities and physical activities, changes in the attitude towards women, sex and alcohol, and in particular changes in reading and media habits.

The terrorist attacks in London in 2005 and not least the terror related arrests in Glostrup, Vollsmose and most recently in Copenhagen emphasise that it is also necessary in Denmark to have early preventive efforts in place that will prevent young people from becoming attracted to extremist and violent circles.

In order to help solve this problem PET has established a special Centre for Prevention under the Preventive Security Department of PET. The centre is responsible for implementing and carrying out a number of concrete projects which are aimed at preventing radicalisation and terrorism and which seek to include all the relevant actors within Danish society in the prevention of radicalisation at as early a stage as possible.

It is PET’s opinion that the prevention of radicalisation should be an integrated part of the crime preventive work which is carried out locally within the framework of the SSP co-operation between schools, the social services, and the police in Denmark. PET has therefore started a co-operation with the Municipality of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police which is aimed at countering radicalisation by including the issue in the local crime preventive work as a focus area in line with areas such as drug abuse and offences against property. The project in Aarhus is a pilot project which can be propagated to all relevant municipalities and police districts.

As part of the pilot project PET supports the local SSP co-operation by offering advice on relevant issues such as when is it radicalisation, which preventive measures will be appropriate to use, and what should be reported to the police. Additionally, PET also contributes with information and experiences from abroad that will make it possible to target the preventive efforts and serve as an inspiration for new preventive measures against radicalisation.

For some time PET has had a close co-operation with the Danish Prison and Probation Service in order to counter radicalisation within its institutions through targeted preventive efforts. As part of this co-operation the two organisations have decided to launch a systematic educational programme for the personnel from the institutions of the Danish Prison and Probation Service which is to make them able to identify signs of radicalisation and to implement preventive measures.

In addition, PET has an ongoing dialogue with a number of educational institutions in order to prevent terrorism. Among other things this dialogue has lead to the implementation of initiatives that are aimed at preventing the misuse of knowledge concerning chemicals and other substances and at preventing the illegal dissemination of knowledge that can be used in connection with the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction. It is PET’s intention to extend this dialogue to also include problems concerning the radicalisation of young people attending Danish educational institutions.

As part of its broad-spectred approach to the prevention of and fight against terrorism PET has established dialogue and contact groups in co-operation with a number of authorities, institutions and organisations in Denmark. This also includes dialogue groups with representatives from ethnic minority groups and Imams.

The PET dialogue groups with the Imams was established in the spring of 2004. The meetings, which take place within this group, are used for exchanging viewpoints concerning matters and issues of common interest just as it is used for implementing joint initiatives concerning e.g. terror financing and radicalisation.

It is PET’s goal to maintain and extend the existing dialogue and contact groups as these initiatives are a natural continuation of PET’s wish to include all relevant parts of Danish society in the prevention of and fight against terrorism.

The dialogue is an important element in the effort to prevent and counter radicalisation.

But the dialogue has no meaning if it is not also extended to include those you do not necessarily agree with and those who may have controversial and unpleasant viewpoints and attitudes.

The purpose of the dialogue is not to legitimise or justify such controversial and unpleasant viewpoints. On the contrary! But it is necessary also to have a dialogue with more fundamentalist religious individuals and circles as well as those, to whom the young potential terrorists listen, if we really want efficient preventive efforts. And it is important to understand that religion has a meaning not just when it comes to radicalisation but also in connection with deradicalisation.

There is hardly any doubt that an important factor in the radicalisation process is the experience – justly or not – among certain young people of being marginalised from the surrounding society. It is therefore important that we as a society try even harder to do our utmost to give the young, who are split between two cultures, a sense of being included in society and of being a part of the community. Also, there is no doubt that as part of this process we need ethnic communities that have strong resources and function well.

In order to make the efforts against terrorism as efficient as possible they must be based on not only extensive prevention but also on vigorously countering concrete terrorist acts and on an effective investigation against and prosecution of terrorists.

The intelligence and security service plays a central role in the prevention, countering and not least the investigation and prosecution of terrorism, and it is necessary that we have a service that has the capacity, resources, and competencies which are required to work efficiently within these areas.

PET has gone through major changes since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and has been provided with further capacities, resources, and competencies continuously.

However, the efforts against terrorism requires ongoing adjustments, and for PET it is also a dynamic process where we on one side must make sure that we integrate and use the new capacities, resources, and competencies and on the other stay open to the possibility that a further strengthening may be necessary.

It is crucial to PET to have easy and fast access to the information which is necessary for us to identify concrete threats and target our intelligence and investigative work.

It is, however, equally important that we have modern and up-to-date IT systems which will guarantee that we are able to process and analyse this information.

With regard to the fight against terrorism it is also prerequisite that PET makes use of the necessary investigative techniques and methods and that we are able to protect these techniques and methods in such a way that they can still be used effectively.

The experience in connection with the new threats following 11 September 2001 has been that we, to a much larger extent, must be prepared as an intelligence and security service not just to take measures against the threats but also to make sure that a criminal investigation and prosecution is carried out against the perpetrators.

This means that we are faced with the classical dilemma of sometimes being forced to postpone an intervention until there is a concrete and solid piece of criminal evidence, but at the same time we must be aware of the security related risks when dealing with individuals who are planning a terrorist attack.

This also means that more than ever we must make sure that our investigations are carried out with the aim of subsequently charging the perpetrator and bringing the criminal case to trial.

The terrorist threat is not a problem linked solely to capitals or a city phenomenon. It concerns the entire country and PET has therefore recently started focusing on strengthening its local and regional presence. This has been done through establishing two regional units for East and West Denmark respectively and by employing regional PET agents within the police districts. Together with the police reform and the establishing of new and larger police districts this will hopefully contribute to the efforts against terrorism through an even closer co-operation between PET and the police districts.

PET‘s use of sources, informants, and – in certain cases – civilian agents is absolutely crucial if we are to be able to identify and counter concrete terrorist threats, and we are focusing on becoming even better at using what could be described as “human intelligence”.

Another focus area for PET is that we wish to contribute towards strengthening and further developing the international co-operation in connection with the fight against terrorism.

The co-operation between the intelligence and security services today is far too similar to the one during the Cold War, and it is necessary that we become better at co-operating multilaterally and operationally across borders and at involving other law enforcement authorities. At the same time it is also necessary that we expand our co-operation with a number of countries with whom we have not previously had a close co-operation but who are especially important when it comes to the efforts against terrorism. These countries are e.g. – but not exclusively – countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

Naturally, this extended co-operation contains both practical and legal problems but these are problems for which we must find proper solutions.

Both nationally and internationally it is also in PET’s absolute interest that the fight against terrorism on one side is efficient and on the other that it takes place on a legally sound basis. We must constantly be aware that this balance is maintained.

Furthermore, it is equally important – also for PET – that an effective control exists of how we use the powers we have been given and which may seem quite far reaching to the individual citizen. The control is important to our work and especially to the trust in PET which is required.

Prerequisite to this trust is also a certain openness towards the public on PET’s behalf, and PET is constantly striving to be as open as possible without compromising the confidentiality which is necessary for PET to carry out its operational efforts.

The openness is also important if we want to realise what we at PET see as an important goal, namely to engage the entire Danish society in protecting the values on which it is based. This is a task that is much too important to be left solely in the hands of PET.