The Danish Security Intelligence Service
Annual Report 2004–2005
Introduction

This annual report covers the period from 2004 to spring 2006. However, on account of chronology it holds the designation: Annual Report 2004-2005 of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (abbreviated PET or referred to as the Service).

Generally, this period has been characterised by an intense pressure of work in our Service. Recent years have clearly proved that the radical Islamist terrorism still highly poses a threat against Europe and Denmark. At the same time, this period has emphasised the complex threat image and with it the challenges the Western World is facing in relation to an efficient fight against terrorism in the short- and long-term, respectively.

The terrorist acts in Madrid and London for one thing gave evidence that Europe has become an independent target for radical Islamist terrorists. The terrorist acts have also emphasised the fact that the open European societies, in spite of an increased level of security, are and will always remain vulnerable to terrorism. It must also be taken into consideration that acts of terrorism can be committed by persons who are born and grow up in our respective societies and who have not attracted the attention of the authorities before. Terrorists can operate with very simple type of weapons on their own, with a short planning ahead and without the support from more professional terrorist networks. This situation means that acts of terrorism can and will be carried out without warning.

As for Denmark, the threat image is emphasised by the fact that the Service increasingly receives information from at home and abroad including internet threats that must be handled as indications of or threats on situations related to terrorism. The Service spends consider-
in this committee and contributed actively to the wording of quite a number of the 49 recommendations of further initiatives on the counter-terrorism field which were included in the report from the committee which was published on 3 November 2005. On the basis of the recommendations in this report, the Danish Government prepared a plan of action which at present is being implemented in different contexts. This includes a number of initiatives that require legislation, among other things improved investigative efforts in the IT- and telecommunications fields and the exchange of information between the Service and other public authorities. These new initiatives will make up a fine supplement to the intensified efforts, which have been initiated by the Service in recent years with a view to matching a still more complex threat image.

Immediately after the publication of the Bernstein report, the Danish Government decided on implementing the recommendations listed in the report.

Firstly, a recommendation of the transfer of 150 members of staff from the Danish National Centre on Investigative Support (NEC) to PET. The purpose of this transfer is primarily to strengthen the operational investigative efforts in the counter-terrorism field, though 150 new members of staff will also bring with them quite a few new tasks that will demand considerable resources.

Secondly, a new centre for anti-terror analysis is to be established within PET. This centre is to prepare threat assessments and analyses on the most wide-ranging basis possible and is to be made up of employees from PET, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

Finally, a benchmarking of the two Danish intelligence services was to be carried out with a view to evaluating their products, working processes, organisations and use of resources.

The benchmarking of PET was available at the end of April 2006 and its overall conclusion was that “the performance, efficiency and esteem of the Service has increased considerably since 11 September 2001” and that PET’s operational flexibility, proactive and open access and also the particularly broad intelligence qualifications in the counter-terrorist field, is placing PET among the best intelligence services in Europe.” Furthermore, the report concludes that “PET largely has obtained the vision that was advanced in 2003” and that terminates at the end of 2006.

However, the report also indicates that “the Service is facing substantial new challenges in its daily work and the continuous organisation expansion” with a view to securing the greatest efficiency possible in the joint national security and intelligence efforts.

The report contains – on this background – a number of good and useful remarks and recommendations that will agree with the activities and thinking that have already been initiated in the Service or are about to be introduced. These recommendations and the recommendations included in the independent report which has been elaborated for the Danish Defence Intelligence Service will now be handled as one body in the Danish Government and subsequently form part of the joint basis on the wording of the objectives of the Service during coming years: Vision 2009.

Enjoy your reading
Lars Findsen
Director General
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I. PET Benchmarking
At the end of the 1920s, a political department was set up in the Copenhagen Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as the first actual intelligence service in Denmark. In the first years, the department was purely a Copenhagen-based affair, but after a few years, the chief constables all over Denmark were ordered to report some specific cases to this department.

In 1939 a national intelligence service was set up under the National Commissioner, given the name of Security Police (SIPO). The service was re-established after the Occupation in 1945 in the name of the National Commissioner’s Intelligence Department (Danish abbreviation REA). In 1951 the intelligence department experienced a general restructuring and was given its present name Politiets Efterretnings- tjeneste, in English the Danish Security Intelligence Service (Danish abbreviation PET). From 1955 to 1958, PET operated as an independent office when in 1958 the service was again placed under the office of the National Commissioner as a police inspectorate, Department G, reporting directly to the Minister of Justice.

Until 1960 the police districts of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg as well as Søndre and Nordre Birk were not included in the otherwise nation-wide competence of the Service, but from 1960 to 1966 the Service assumed the responsibility of the intelligence activities in respect of these four police districts and since then, the Service has been a national service.
Personal Protection Officers of PET at a roof in Baghdad in connection with a Danish ministerial visit.
The international security political situation 2004–2005

As previously pointed out, the general level of threat has been increased in the western world since 11 September 2001, including Denmark. The military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, have further affected the level of threat. Moreover, the terrorist acts committed in recent years in Madrid, Amsterdam and London have made it clear that this increased level of threat is more complex than the world has seen before and thus constitutes a considerable challenge to the national security and intelligence services. To this should be added that the caricatures of the Prophet have contributed to bringing negative focus on Denmark, which also affects the threatening scene. This chapter describes and discusses the implications of these events on the threatening scene in a European context and the security problems they give rise to in Europe, including Denmark.

Today it is assessed that radical Islamists in Europe will, mainly, be able to carry out simple terrorist acts and terrorist acts of a certain complexity.

Very complex, spectacular acts similar to the ones committed in the United Stated on 11 September 2001 and the ones that were planned against Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in Great Britain are so demanding – among other things as to management and special skills – that the preparations are very time-consuming and also involve travels, communication and transfers of funds over considerable distances.

However, it should be underlined that these networks are capable of adapting to operational conditions that are increasingly difficult and still manage to choose targets involving huge impact compared to the resources that the groups have at their disposal. Therefore,

A terrorist act of a certain complexity

A terrorist act of a certain complexity could for instance be composed of a series of bombs aimed at unprotected or poorly protected targets (Madrid and London). Such an act requires quite some preparation, co-ordination and know-how. This makes considerable demands on the terrorists’ ability to communicate and carry out reconnaissance without being detected but does not take many resources, sophisticated weapons or special skills.

A simple terrorist act

A simple terrorist act for example is characterised by a single individual or a few individuals procuring a weapon, for instance a handweapon, a hand-grenade or a simple home-made bomb, and attacking an unprotected target. Such an act neither takes long preparations nor extensive capacity such as financing, reconnaissance, operational and communicative security or sophisticated knowledge of the application of explosives. However, such an act could be highly grave and cause a major subsequent psychological effect.
it is most likely that unprotected and poorly protected targets will be chosen. Due to the reduced number of individuals and the very limited preparative activities such terrorist acts demand, it will be even more difficult to uncover the perpetrators in advance. Carrying out a terrorist act against this type of target takes relatively few means and limited planning and training but causes considerable attention.

**MADRID, AMSTERDAM, LONDON – GLOBAL JIHAD IN A LOCAL CONTEXT**

The terrorist acts committed in Madrid in March 2004, the assault against the Dutch, controversial film director Theodor van Gogh on 2 November 2004 and, not least, the terrorist acts in London on 7 July 2005 and the subsequent failed terrorist act on 21 July 2005 are all examples of the development described above in which terrorist acts are committed by local and autonomously operating groups that receive none or only little support from abroad.

**European terrorist acts**

**Madrid**

On 11 March 2004, from 0737 to 0739 hours [Spanish local time], a Spain-based radical Islamic group carried out a series of co-ordinated explosions against the railway in Madrid. Almost 200 individuals were killed and approximately 1,400 were injured in connection with the attacks. Behind the attacks was a local network composed of North African immigrants. The bombs were released via timers. On 3 April 2004, the main persons in this network committed suicide by releasing an explosive charge inside an apartment in the Madrid suburb Leganés after having been surrounded by the Spanish police. In April 2006, the Spanish authorities have charged 29 persons with complicity in the terrorist acts.

**Amsterdam**

On 2 November 2004 at 0845 hours [Dutch local time], the Dutch television debater and film director Theodor van Gogh was killed in the street in central Amsterdam. Van Gogh was a prominent media person in the Netherlands and known for his critical statements on Islam and Muslims in Holland. The killing was committed by the Dutch male of Moroccan origin, Muhammed Borry, who was a member of a radical Islamic network in Holland – the so-called Hofstad Group. This group was composed of young Dutch men of chiefly Moroccan background who, among other places, were inspired to carry out their acts by the debate on domestic politics concerning the Muslims’ role in the Dutch society.

**London**

On 7 July 2005 at 0850 hours [British local time], four men carried out a suicide attack with a series of co-ordinated bomb blasts against three subway trains in London. One hour later, a bomb was also released in a double-decker bus.
More than 50 people were killed and approximately 700 were injured. The bombs were home-made, based on texts found on the Internet. Three of the perpetrators were of Pakistani origin but were born and grew up in Great Britain. Another group attempted to carry out a similar terrorist act two weeks later on 21 July 2005 against three trains on other subway stations and a bus. In this case, the perpetrators mainly had an East-African background. Despite of the attacks having some points of resemblance, still nothing indicates that there was a direct connection between the persons behind the terrorist acts committed on 7 and 21 July 2005, respectively.

The selection of targets and the planning were characterised by improvisation and were the result of the capacity that the network had at its disposal. Several of the terrorists were born and grew up in these countries, they had studied, had jobs and were apparently well integrated in the respective societies. Also, only few of them were previously known by the police authorities. The networks were composed of young men and, apparently, were not centrally co-ordinated from outside Europe. To this must be added that the Internet played a crucial part as source of inspiration and base of knowledge. This indicates that, in some aspects, the Internet had been given the part and function that the previous training camps in e.g. Afghanistan used to play. Most of the terrorists had not been distinctly religious before becoming involved in a radicalisation process and the terrorists did not practise their religion in the established mosque circles.

The terrorists who were behind the terrorist acts in Madrid, Amsterdam and London are examples of local, radicalised networks who, in a relatively short time frame, changed from chiefly sympathising with or supporting terrorism to having an actual operational capacity and becoming able to, with relatively few means, carry out well co-ordinated and effective terrorist acts. In addition, they showed that it was possible for the groups to plan and carry out these acts of terrorism without the authorities having direct indications that a terrorist act was being prepared.

Furthermore, the terrorist acts in Madrid, Amsterdam and London have made it clear that the step from supporting terrorism to becoming actively and operationally involved does not take long preparations or extensive resources. Likewise, the mental process from thought to action is shorter than it was presumed earlier.

What the networks behind the Madrid, Amsterdam and London terrorist acts had in common was the fact that they were extremely closed and the members met primarily on a private basis. Moreover, it has turned out that individuals in these networks who were apparently of secondary importance became actual operators. Finally, the most recent terrorist acts also show that a considerable part of the radicalisation process takes place in those countries where the perpetrators reside and that more professional military/operational training in remotely situated camps is not always required in order to carry out acts of terrorism. Furthermore, Madrid proved the example that terrorist networks in Europe have obtained equipment and weapons through “ordinary” criminal circles.

No operational connections have been ascertained between the perpetrators responsible for the terrorist acts in London in July 2005.
and established militant Islamic networks such as al-Qaeda. However, it seems likely that at least some of the perpetrators behind the terrorist acts on 7 July had contact to terrorist networks during their stays at Islamic Koran schools in Pakistan. For the present, there is no information whether the perpetrators responsible for the attacks committed on 21 July could be connected with wider networks. So far, information seems to suggest that the terrorist acts committed on 7 and 21 July 2005 were carried out by local, independent groups who were inspired by the global militant Islamic movement and by previous terrorist acts.

Summing up it is held that the three terrorist acts and the subsequent investigation in a number of European countries underline the general threats that characterise Europe today, which become increasingly more complex, and also display the substantial challenge the national security services are facing. The three terrorist acts seem to confirm the assumption that a breeding ground exists of primarily young males of Muslim background or affiliation who, for different reasons, are attracted by radical forces and inspired by al-Qaeda’s global Jihad ideology but who act autonomously and, apparently, without any control, support and planning from outside. These individuals are capable of selecting targets, planning, financing and carrying out terrorist acts by themselves. They appear extremely security conscious and are often lucky enough to operate without being in the searchlight of the police authorities.

The radicalisation of the individual that can lead to terrorist activities is prompted by a number
of factors at the ideological, social and personal level. Moreover, activities in extremist networks in a long series of countries in the Middle East, the Gulf States, East and North Africa and South Asia have influenced persons in Europe.

It is possible that in the future examples will emerge of influence from countries in West Africa and Central and South East Asia where militant extremism is widespread, too. PET already assesses that the national or ethnic affiliations of radical Islamists will play an increasingly subordinate part. The extremist ideology and the way the individual experiences the life conditions in the country where he or she lives will play an increasingly major part.

Suicide terrorism

The terrorist acts in London in July 2005 brought suicide terrorism into focus in a European context. It is true that British nationals have previously been involved in suicide terrorism committed outside Europe, and a number of the individuals behind the Madrid bombings in March 2004 blew themselves up after having been surrounded by the authorities, however, with the terrorist acts in London it was the first time that suicide attacks were committed in such a solid and carefully planned way. Suicide terrorism raises quite special problems compared to other forms of terrorism; firstly, they send a very special and particularly strong “message” to both the societies they hit and the persons attracted to and who themselves consider taking active part in terrorism; secondly, both prevention and investigation of acts of suicide terrorism are made difficult due to the fact that the terrorists do not have to worry about how to escape from the scene of the crime or how to remain undisclosed. Thus, in certain circles, suicide terrorism could constitute a very special force of attraction in relation to radicalisation and recruitment courses. It naturally follows that there will be no subsequent chance of interrogating the perpetrators which, naturally, reduces the authorities’ possibility for establishing the motive, uncover other relevant events in the course of radicalisation and apprehend possible accomplices, etc. To this should be added that the authorities that must fight suicide terrorism, including and particularly the police, must adopt completely separate measures to assure the citizens’ and their own security.

Terrorist acts with chemical and biological substances

PET has no knowledge of any chemical or biological terrorist acts in Europe. Up to now, terrorist acts in Europe have been committed by the use of relatively simple homemade bombs. However, on several occasions, radical Islamists have demonstrated their intent to apply biological and chemical substances in connection with terrorist acts in and outside Europe. In January 2003, remedies
and material for the production of ricin in London were found, and in December 2002 an extremist was arrested in France; he had been experimenting on how to make ricin and had in his possession manuals that described how to make botulinum toxin in his parents’ apartment.

It should be expected that radical extremists will reattempt to prepare terrorist acts using toxic substances in Europe as well. There is every reason to believe that some radical terrorists are capable of manufacturing small quantities of toxic substances that could be used in connection with terrorist acts or attacks. As it is so easy to obtain commercially available toxic substances such as plant protective products, it is likely that radical Islamists will attempt to apply such chemical substances. However, it has proven very difficult to modify chemical and biological weapons with the purpose of using them as a specific weapon that can be used in connection with a terrorist act. Likewise, the substances are, obviously, very dangerous to the persons who must produce and handle them.

**Declarations of threat from al-Qaida and other “Internet groups”**

Various forms of threats are often made through the media. Even if there is no real operational capacity behind, such threats frighten the populations in the countries that are being threatened. Furthermore, they could inspire radical Islamists who have or are in a position to obtain capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the countries mentioned in the threats. The threats that were made against a number of European countries after the terrorist attacks
in London in July 2005 are examples of the way "Internet groups" such as the "Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades" can contribute to the creation of fear and give an erroneous impression of a specific, immediate terror threat, and they can also inspire others who have the capacity to carry out terrorist acts against the countries mentioned in the threats.

Al-Qaida's ideological top management also makes threats regularly. Networks inspired by al-Qaida may interpret these threats as calls for (continuous) terror activities against the targets mentioned. Nevertheless, it is assessed that the top leaders within al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are so weakened in their contact with radical Islamic circles in Europe that, in reality, they do not know whether actual terrorist acts are being planned. Thus, it is assessed that the threats made by the top management are not in themselves signs of an imminent terrorist act being planned against Europe or any other place. There are examples of countries that have been threatened and subsequently hit and countries that have not been threatened but subsequently have still been struck by terrorist acts. The most important aspect is whether there are capacity and planning potential present in the countries that are threatened.

**Europe – “a place for Jihad”**

As mentioned, the terrorist acts in Madrid, Amsterdam and particularly London are examples of the development that the radical Islamic terrorism has undergone in recent years. This development has rendered it necessary to reformulate the idea that Europe is primarily a support and recruitment area for Islamic based terrorist networks. Whereas the western countries, Europe in particular, used to be chiefly considered "a place for recruitment, logistics and financing", the international security political development has meant that Europe today should increasingly be considered "a place for Jihad". In other words, there are groups of individuals in a number of European countries who, for various reasons, are attracted by circles characterised by a fundamentalist, radicalised interpretation of Islam. In many cases, these persons were born and grew up in the countries in question; they appear well integrated and have not previously attracted the authorities' attention but are prepared to carry out violent acts in these countries; they consider the society in which they reside as part of the frontline and, sometimes, they are ready to sacrifice their own lives for the cause.
"IN DENMARK TOO THERE ARE CIRCLES AND INDIVIDUALS THAT ARE SUBJECTED TO SUCH RADICALISATION THAT THEY SEEM PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN REAL TERROR-RELATED ACTIVITIES."

THE THREAT TO DENMARK

On a number of previous occasions, PET has stated that in Denmark, too, there are persons and circles that sympathise with and/or support groups that are involved in terrorist activities. It is PET’s view that the Glostrup case, among others, – even though investigation is still ongoing – underlines this circumstance and that, consequently, in Denmark too there are circles and individuals that are subjected to such radicalisation that they seem prepared to engage in real terror-related activities.

The investigation in this field mainly focuses on five different categories of persons/circles among which, according to PET’s assessment, there is a risk that persons or groups might be found who are prepared to or who are being encouraged to apply undemocratic or even violent methods in order to reach their goals. It should be stressed that the borderlines between the different categories may prove fluid and the list of categories is, obviously, not exhaustive.

The first category consists of persons who were not born and grew up in Denmark but who have come to this country as asylum seekers or in connection with a family reunion, etc. Typically, they come from countries in North Africa and the Middle East and sympathise with various terrorist movements involved in conflicts in the countries in question. Several of these individuals have also spent time in training camps in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia. Among other things, the intelligence efforts in this field focus on the extent to which these individuals on the basis of their experience and contacts attempt to exert an ideological influence or provide financial support and equipment in connection with possible terrorist actions in Denmark or abroad. Furthermore, PET focuses on the extent to which these persons act as connecting links that undertake contact, transportation and logistics for individuals who want to participate in Jihad in Iraq or Chechnya, for instance.

The second category consists of persons, often among second and third generation immigrants, who live in a cultural and political vacuum and who feel demonised, ostracised and rejected by the surrounding society, the media, on the labour market, in discotheques, etc. Moreover, what can be said about a great many of those who make up this group is that they are poorly integrated, they have not succeeded in school and they have been in touch with social authorities and the police at an early age. Several in this group have never received education, many are engaged in small-scale criminality, and some are involved in various forms of more serious criminality. PET pays attention to the extent to which speculation is made in radical Islamic circles in order to attract some of these young persons, who may prove to be “easy” victims of the promise to find a standpoint and an identity, which a fundamentalist version of Islam may offer. By “fishing” in these circles more or less core criminals can be recruited connected with both criminal circles and persons who can possibly get hold of weapons, explosives, false papers, etc. and who themselves are experienced operators without getting into the searchlight of the authorities.

A third category consists of young individuals usually of another ethnic origin and who appear well integrated but who, for various reasons, are attracted by a radical, militant version of Islam (“the invisibles”). Converts who, for various reasons, have become radical Islamists make up the fourth category. Out of the approximately two thousand Danish nationals who are considered having converted
to Islam, only few have become radicalised. With European looks and general identity papers, these radical converts can often operate more unrestrictedly, and they can assist other radical Islamists in connection with bank accounts and logistic support and by spreading propaganda.

The fifth category is composed of the ideologists, i.e. persons characterised by being relatively well-educated and eloquent, and whose aim is to create a world-embracing Islamic state, the so-called Caliphate. This group includes the persons who openly argue that Islam is irreconcilable with democracy. Moreover, anti-Islamic conspiracy theories, which are intensified by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, among other places, are propagated. As regards this group, PET focuses on the risk that it contributes to radicalisation of young Muslims living in Denmark, a radicalisation that could imply, in the longer run, that “weak souls” take a further step in an actual military direction.

Generally speaking, it should be noted that representatives from the above groups on their own in Denmark might be able to carry out terrorist acts of a certain complexity but which do not require extensive preparations or planning. This means that terrorist acts might be committed without prior warning. These persons and circles might also be able to provide logistic support to any arriving terrorists or terrorist groups who might have the intention to carry out terrorist acts on Danish soil. In addition, terrorist groups or individual terrorists could enter Denmark with the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts on Danish soil without logistic support from persons or circles in Denmark. In the longer run, also radical Islamists who have returned from war zones in which they have fought against the government and the Coalition Forces in Iraq might pose a threat in Denmark.

Additionally, the Danish participation in Iraq and Afghanistan affects the risk of terrorist acts being committed against both Danish and foreign targets in Denmark and Danish targets abroad. A terrorist act against Denmark may be perceived by terrorists as a natural extension of their fight against the international coalition in Iraq. Furthermore, Danish radical circles intensely focus on the conflict in Iraq. It is likely that this focus will further increase should the political development in Iraq lead to even more violent resistance.

To sum up, PET assesses that the current international security political situation has meant that there is a generally increased level of terrorist threat at present in the western world, including Denmark. This level of threat was further underlined following the bomb attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. In addition, the publication of the caricatures of the Prophet in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten is of importance to the development of the level of terrorist threat to Denmark.

In this connection, PET assesses that the capacity required to carry out a simple terrorist act and also a terrorist act of a certain complexity is relatively limited and should, therefore, be presumed to be present. Moreover, it is the assessment that it must be presumed, based on general indications and the extent of isolated threats in certain circles, that intention is present. Thus, since the beginning of January 2006, PET has registered more than 200 threats related to the conflict as a consequence of the publication of the Prophet caricatures.
"THE CAPACITY REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT A SIMPLE TERRORIST ACT AND ALSO A TERRORIST ACT OF A CERTAIN COMPLEXITY IS RELATIVELY LIMITED AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE PRESUMED TO BE PRESENT".
The Danish Security Intelligence Service – throughout 2004-2005

2.

ORGANISATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

Strategy and structure
During recent years, PET has worked determinedly towards adapting its organisation and handling of tasks to suit the development of the general threats. The terrorist networks have increasingly demonstrated their ability to adapt to still more demanding terms and conditions of operations and for selecting targets that would generate large effects compared to the relatively limited resources employed. This means shorter reaction times and thereby increased demands for even more rapid and precise intelligence efforts.

The general threats also require that the traditional intelligence activities are supplemented by wide-ranging efforts. Therefore during recent years, PET has put still more emphasis on involving society more generally in the counter-terrorism efforts. This work is an ongoing process that will continue and expand in scope.

At the end of 2003, PET initiated a project on strategic planning which in recent years has been the backbone of the Service’s concentration on objectives and results. A mission and a vision have been formulated for the Service.

As it appears, the vision shall be fulfilled by the end of 2006. Some partners have already expressed that they assess that essentially the Service’s vision has already been fulfilled. An assessment which is shared by and expressed in the benchmarking of PET carried out by a foreign expert in the first four months of 2006. During 2006 PET will conduct an actual user or interested party analysis with the purpose of further clarifying as to whether this assessment is correct. This analysis and the above-mentioned benchmarking of the Service’s products, work processes, organisation and resource application will form the basis of a strategic work that will be concluded with a new vision/mission for the future activities of the Service.

The aim of the Service is to set up a new strategic framework that will form part of a total three-year (2007-2009) development plan for the Service. The plan will continue the development already undergone by the Service and will include all the business areas of the Service. The plan will set up goals for operations and development both within the fields of organisation, management, competencies and in respect of planning the work processes of the Service and the implementation of further tools for the management of the Service’s “performance”.

Vision:

Being recognised by citizens, companies, operational co-operation partners, politicians and public authorities by the end of 2006 as the co-ordinating authority engaged in efficient, proactive and extroverted efforts to protect Denmark’s national security.

Mission:

Serving as the national security authority to prevent, investigate and counter undertakings and acts that pose a threat or a potential threat to the maintenance of Denmark as a free, democratic and safe society.
"THROUGH GREATER OPENNESS ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SERVICE, IT IS THE INTENTION TO SECURE THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF CO-OPERATIVENESS IN SOCIETY IN GENERAL."

As stated in PET’s Annual Report 2003, the Service adopted a general strategy in order to focus its work to fulfil the mission. The two-prong strategy is the foundation of all the activities carried out by the Service these years: a further strengthening of the investigation of the Service and its external co-ordinating role.

The first prong reflects the strategic aim defined as the core tasks (monitoring and investigation). In this connection, the Service has focused on strengthening the so-called classic intelligence activities, i.e. human sources, interception and other technical information gathering, secret searches, monitoring and information retrieval and use. The overall aim for these efforts is to maintain the monitoring of the target persons already known and to identify target persons still unknown.

The transnational nature of terrorism calls for an extensive and efficient international co-operation. Therefore, the Service has also intensified the efforts in relation to its operational bilateral co-operation with foreign intelligence and security services, including services in countries with which PET has not previously collaborated. Furthermore, the Service has strengthened existing operational co-operation with a wide range of central authorities, including the general police, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, the Danish Immigration Service and the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime.

The second prong reflects the strategic objective of the Service involving all relevant actors in society in a wide-ranging counter-terrorism initiative, aimed to improve society's overall robustness and resistance to terrorism. Within the scope of this objective, the Service has forged and will continue to forge co-operation fora with a wide range of public authorities, private companies and actors who directly or indirectly handle tasks or possess competencies or knowledge of relevance to the joint efforts within the field of terrorism. The aim is to target PET's products to the specific needs of its partners, for one thing by providing relevant partners with a better basis for taking relevant measures of a security-related character: In this way, the co-operation must contribute to ensuring wide-ranging efforts and improving overall society's total resistance to terrorism.

This also applies to the general public. Through greater openness about the objectives of the Service, it is the intention to secure the highest possible degree of co-operativeness in society in general. Consistent focus on openness regarding its tasks and methods will help secure and maintain the necessary confidence to the Service, also among the population, which may be able to provide relevant information to PET and thereby contribute to creating a more robust society.

In the spring of 2004, PET had additional resources allocated and as mentioned in the Annual Report 2003, the Service implemented as a consequence hereof a new organisation in order to support the general strategy hence the Service can handle the wide-ranging demands posed by the complex threats of today's world. The investigative and operational
activities have been strengthened by the allocation of staff, among others experienced investigators and analysts with an insight into social conditions, language and culture etc. who will contribute to securing a broad and balanced basis for the operational efforts of the Service. In this respect, it could be mentioned that analysts with an academic degree have been employed in the counter-terrorism division with a view to strengthen the operational analysis related to terrorism in co-operation with specialised police officers and the division is today increasingly influenced by a broad staff mix and cross-functional methods of work.

The Cross-Ministerial Committee on fighting Terrorism
As a result of the terrorist acts in London in July 2005, the Danish Government decided on 5 August 2005 to initiate an analysis of the existing Danish preparedness against terrorism. The Government therefore set up a cross-ministerial committee under the auspices of the Government with the task to present before
1 November 2005 a general review of the Danish society’s preparedness and efforts against terrorist acts, including to incorporate the development and experience gained in other countries and from the international co-operation within the field of terrorism over the past years. On the basis of this review, the committee should present some recommendations for specific initiatives, including legislative initiatives to strengthen the Danish preparedness against terrorism and the possibilities of the authorities to unravel and prosecute possible terrorist acts.

The chairman of the committee was the just then retired Senior Government Official, today Governor of the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, Nils Bernstein. The Committee also comprised representatives of the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the Danish Security Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. Additionally, representatives of the Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs also participated in some of the meetings.

The Committee published its report on 3 November 2005 listing 49 recommendations for strengthening the Danish anti-terror efforts. Among other things, the Committee suggests an increased exchange of information between the police and defence intelligence services, further access to obtaining information on individuals from other authorities, access to flight passenger lists, increased investigative possibilities within the field of telecommunications as well as increased possibility of televised surveillance of vital squares and traffic junctions etc. Furthermore, there are some recommendations of organisational and administrative character. The recommendations are listed in Appendix G.

The Committee states that the number of and the scope of these recommendations are not to be considered as an expression of the present preparedness being insufficient. The terror acts in Madrid and recently London have, however, given rise to considering new initiatives to further strengthen the joint preparedness.

On the basis of the recommendations of the Committee, the Danish Government presented its action plan for the fight against terrorism on 16 November 2005. A Danish version is available at the website of the Prime Minister’s Office, www.stm.dk/publikationer.

In connection with the publication of the action plan, the Government announced that it had decided to implement three of the recommendations immediately which could be carried out administratively: establishing a joint centre for anti-terror analysis, transferring parts of the Danish National Centre of Investigative Support to further strengthen the joint preparedness.
(NEC) to PET and carrying out a benchmark of the Danish intelligence services. These initiatives are further described below.

**New Centre for Terrorism Analysis (CTA)**

With a view to an intensified co-operation between the two Danish intelligence services and also the joint collaboration with other authorities in relation to the terrorist threat against Denmark, a new Centre for Terrorism Analysis will be established within the Service. The Centre will be manned by permanent staff from the Danish Intelligence Security Service, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. The Danish Emergency Management Agency will also be represented in this Centre since threat assessments have implications for the joint Danish emergency preparedness. The participating authorities shall contribute with professional capabilities and networks. The responsibility of each authority will remain unaffected which among other things implies that the responsibility for information and assessments that are being contributed or not from the individual authorities rest with the respective authorities and jurisdictions.

The Centre that will initially be composed of 15 employees, primarily with an analytical background, is to be established during the summer 2006 and will presumably be fully operational by January 2007. The Centre is to be established within the Service since its assignments will be closely connected with PET’s other assignments as a national security authority. The position as head of the Centre was advertised in open competition and an employee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark has been appointed Head of CTA. The intention is that the appointed Head of CTA will consequently contribute to the designation of employees from the respective authorities.

The Centre is to contribute to the preparation of the society’s joint security- and emergency preparedness in the best possible way in order to meet the new challenges in the field of terrorism in consequence of the altered threatening scene. Viewed in the light of these facts, the Centre is to provide a strategic and tactic basis for decisions in the form of systematically elaborated analyses and threat assessments in relation to the terrorist threat to Denmark; analyses which are to be based on the broadest and most relevant basis of information possible. Through the exchange of information including intelligence information, the Centre is to cut across barriers between authorities and give early warning, thus enabling the proper authorities to take the necessary measures with a view to counter possible threats as early as possible. Thus, the Centre is first and foremost a unit for analyses that is to work on the basis of intelligence and information which is obtained and dependent on the authorities involved. This also means that assignments of an operational character, including the retrieval of information and intelligence, will remain unaltered and handled by the authorities involved.

Finally, the Centre is also to contribute to the strengthening of the overall determination of priorities and efforts in the field of security and information in relation to terrorism. Furthermore, the Centre is to contribute to forming the basis of the national emergency planning and training activities on the international, national, regional and local level.

The products of the Centre are intended for public authorities, including relevant ministries, the governmental security organisation, the police, the intelligence services and those authorities that are represented in the Contact Group of Counter Terrorism. Moreover, the so-called critical elements of society as for
instance transport, IT, telecommunication and energy make up an essential target group. Add to this international co-operation partners and the general public.

The transfer of parts of NEC to PET
In order to strengthen the operational efforts in the counter-terrorist field, the Government decided to transfer parts of the National Centre of Investigative Support (NEC) to the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET).

Approximately 150 positions are to be transferred to PET and this includes parts of the Flying Squad, the Special Operations Team, the surveillance and technical group, parts of the monitoring and analysis unit and also the witness protection group. Furthermore, the working field of the Service will be enlarged by the most serious (international, cross-border, professional) organised crime that is being committed by use of violence, threats and weapons in not very accessible circles where the security level is high. The purpose is, among other things, to create a basis for a surveillance of possible relations to the field of terrorism.

The objective of the incorporation of staff from NEC is as previously mentioned to strengthen the operational efforts in the counter-terrorism field since, however, in addition the transfer will imply a number of new tasks that will also demand considerable resources. PET and NEC are to a certain extent closely affiliated as regards operational methods and tools. This is for example the case in relation to the use of sources, surveillance and technical operations.

The incorporation of the parts of NEC mentioned will contribute to ensuring a provision of experienced investigators, surveillance officers, technicians and others who qua their backgrounds and capabilities will form part of and contribute

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to the strengthening of the intelligence efforts of the Service in the field of counter-terrorism.

Furthermore, the transfer agrees very well with the coming police reform with its considerably fewer and thus larger police districts that call for further specialisation and development of crucial national top capabilities on a central level. In continuation of this, the police reform implies that the new large police districts themselves in the long term shall be able to solve a number of tasks to which NEC has previously provided assistance.

The transfer of staff will not change the fact that assistance will still be given to the police districts from central quarters (i.e. the police division) in traditional monitoring fields (white slave traffic, counterfeiting, contraband and hard drugs etc.). As concerns surveillance, technology et cetera, PET will continue to give assistance to the police districts during a transitional period.

The role of the Service is to elaborate analyses and proposals to investigations in relation to organised crime. If occasion should arise, the investigation will subsequently be rooted in the relevant police district by specified agreement. All Court orders in that connection will be retrieved by the police district in question and not by the Service. The cases will be handled according to the general rules of the Administration of Justice Act and they are subject to usual supervision and control by the Public Prosecutor in question.

The Service’s handling of this field will, moreover, be subject to the same mechanisms of control as the other activities of the Service are today, i.e. the Wamberg Committee and the Control Committee.

To secure the above-mentioned considerations related to the transfer of staff, the Service has prepared a number of focus spheres that will contribute to a swift and flexible actual transfer. This will also be done by an appropriate involvement of management, staff and co-committee and with all respect for the different cultures that are prevalent in PET and NEC and amongst their employees. The transfer will presumably be carried out during the summer 2006.

Benchmarking the activities of the Danish intelligence services

As you will know, since the terrorist acts in the United States on 11 September 2001, a number of initiatives have been taken to strengthen the effort against international terrorism, including by strengthening the readiness of the police and intelligence services. Similarly, additional resources have been allocated to the intelligence services.

With reference to an assessment of whether these measures are adequate to match the actual threatening scene, the Danish Government decided to carry out a benchmarking of the Danish Security Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. The object was to assess the quality and relevance of the activities of the intelligence services, including resource application, organisation and interface to other authorities. Furthermore, the analysis was to assess the changes in the organisation and in the way of handling the tasks implemented as a result of the changing threat image during recent years. In connection with the implementation of the analysis, it was a condition that an attitude to the demands related to resources that had been indicated from the cross-ministerial working committee was to await the analysis of the two services. Against that background, a joint memorandum
was to be presented to the Government as to what extent a change of priorities should be effected or whether further resources should be allocated to the intelligence services and the police. Foreign experts, with knowledge of intelligence activities acquired through experience in similar organisations conducted the analysis. The analysis was carried out with the restrictions that are necessary to protect the capacity, sources and liaisons of the intelligence services. On 17 May 2006 the Danish Minister of Justice published an unclassified summary of the Benchmarking of the Danish Security Intelligence Service, containing 12 recommendations points out the necessity to develop a longer term and more strategic approach to the recruitment, acquisition and further development of the skills that the Service needs. This is an expression of the fact that the Service should continue to engage more employees with other backgrounds than from the police, including academic, technical and others. An essential point in the review is the IT situation of the Service. According to the report the latter forms a substantial weakness and thus there is an urgent need for action. Finally, the review contains a number of recommendations concerning resources.

The review on PET generally concludes that "PET's operational capacity, proactive, open approach and highly broad range of intelligence capabilities place it amongst the top intelligence services in Europe". Furthermore, the review concludes that "PET has mainly achieved the vision that was launched in 2003" and expires at the end of 2006.

The review, however, also points out that "the Service is facing further substantial new challenges in its daily work and continuous organisational development" in preparation for securing the greatest efficiency possible in the joint national security and intelligence efforts.

On this background the review advances 12 specific recommendations that are partly aimed at PET and partly at the ministerial level.

As to the Service the recommendations still concern the continuing development and application of systematic processes in relation to the management of key change programmes and projects. Furthermore, the review recommends a continuous strengthening of the cooperation with the general police and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. It also points the need to develop a longer-term and more strategic approach to the recruitment, acquisition and further development of the skills that the Service needs. This is an expression of the fact that the Service should continue to engage more employees with other backgrounds than from the police, including academic, technical and others. An essential point in the review is the IT situation of the Service. According to the report the latter forms a substantial weakness and thus there is an urgent need for action. Finally, the review contains a number of recommendations concerning resources.

As mentioned in the introduction, there is a good connection with initiatives and reflection that have already been or will be implemented in the Service and the Service is now planning to implement and make operational the recommendations that are aimed at the Service in the review.

The unclassified part of the review and the 12 recommendations appear from Appendix I.

In continuation of the Government's decision to transfer parts of NEC and a new field of responsibility to PET, it followed naturally to adjust the organisation of the Service. The alteration shall, furthermore, support the Service's request to make its external, advisory and co-ordinating operations into a strategic field of aims. Add to this that the adjustment will provide the conditions for utilising the capabilities of the different divisions to a larger extent.

The organisational changes will presumably be carried out during the summer 2006.
Strengthening PET's IT competences

As mentioned above, PET has in recent years determinedly endeavoured to recruit a number of new members of staff with an educational background deviating from what has traditionally been represented in the police, including persons with IT specialist knowledge. Thus during the autumn of 2004, the Service took on several IT graduates. These employments have upgraded the competences of the Service significantly with respect to the internal support and logistics as well as the more technical investigation and surveillance.

In the light of the general technological development, and particularly the increasing importance of information technology to the criminality that must be investigated by the Service, it is of vital importance that in the future PET will be able to employ more highly-educated IT persons. In addition, up-to-date IT qualifications are essential prerequisites for establishing a new IT platform for the Service.

New IT platform

The existing IT platform of PET is today outdated. The need for a marked improvement of the IT platform has lately been expressed in the benchmarking undertaken by the Deputy Director General of the British Security Service (MI5), a summary of which is available in Appendix I. This benchmarking highlights the inadequate IT support as a major vulnerability.

On this background, PET initiated an extensive IT analysis assisted by external consultants from Systematic A/S and in agreement with the Danish Ministry of Justice and the National Commissioner. The purpose was through a preliminary analysis to uncover the weaknesses of the existing IT platform and on this basis to carry out a detailed and thorough analysis of PET’s requirements for IT support. The analysis has provided the basis for the formulation of the framework and principles of a future IT platform to ensure greater efficiency and optimisation of PET’s administrative work planning and thus to secure the optimum support of its core tasks in the operative area.

The preliminary analysis was initiated in 2003 and confirmed that the present IT structure and administrative routines are outdated and inappropriate. Among other things, it was pointed out that the structure does not sufficiently support the possibilities for establishing and maintaining operational situation awareness. Likewise, the coherent and efficient support of the core activities is inadequate. The overall assessment is that the present IT structure reduces the operational overview and impedes the exchange of knowledge across the organisation. Popularly speaking the situation
could be expressed as follows: “PET does not know what PET knows.”

In 2004 based on the above pre-study, an analysis of the information management processes was made. On this background, a prototype of a new IT platform focusing on the intelligence and inquiry process of the Service was developed.

In January 2005, a requirement specification project was launched to specify the requirements for functionality, system architecture, security, system management, development and implementation etc. The project ended in September 2005. Then an extensive internal review was carried out of the requirements specifications in order to ensure that the new IT platform will meet the quality requirements that naturally must be made to an intelligence service. Finally, with the assistance of KPMG Advisory (now Capacent), PET initiated a similar external review in October 2005. The scope was to obtain an independent assessment of the requirements specifications, including its quality, completeness and compliance with applicable standards and recommendations for public IT projects.

The external assessment closed in March 2006 and concluded that “well-structured, very thorough and detailed” requirements have been prepared that may provide the basis for commencing actual negotiations for a contract. However, before taking such step, a final decision must be made at the political level as well as in terms of use of resources.

The new IT platform must ensure the ability of the Service to establish and maintain a real-time overview and optimum use of the information that the Service receives, retrieves and produces. Furthermore, the new platform is a prerequisite for a fully expanded close digital co-operation with other authorities, including in particular the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. In other words, the establishment of a new IT platform is a vital prerequisite for the Service to meet the requirements and expectations advanced these days. The benchmarking report underlines this issue, see Appendix I, in which it is stated that “PET has a pressing need to update and improve its IT to support better its counter-terrorist work.” The report further points out that PET’s information and IT requirements for solving its tasks cannot be met by police systems.

Therefore, PET has prepared an IT timetable that – as recommended in the report – contains a combination of short-term and long-term initiatives. The timetable aims at a progressive, staged use of all IT-based gains step by step as the IT platform is unfolded. The IT timetable is ready for immediate implementation.

Moreover, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, the Wamberg Committee is formulating new updated guidelines for the PET handling of information on persons and organisations. The new guidelines will make it possible to update and search electronically any information requested and to share such information across the organisation. The new guidelines that are expected prepared during 2006 are also a vital prerequisite for the setting up of a new IT platform.
THE OPERATIONAL DIVISIONS

Counter-terrorism

For many years, the field of counter-terrorism has been one of the core tasks of PET. The efforts within this field have, however, been strengthened significantly over the past years as a result of the threat from radical, Islamic terrorism. PET’s investigations within the field of counter-terrorism are based on Section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code, which deals with a number of serious crimes (e.g. homicide, arson, kidnapping and hijacking of aircraft etc.) that are committed by groups, organisations and individuals with the intent to frighten the population, destabilise the order of society or seek to force Danish or foreign authorities and international organisations to carry out or fail to carry out an act.

Like in many other countries, there are also individuals and circles in Denmark who sympathise with or have relations to persons and organisations that have been involved in terrorist activities. Within the field of investigation, PET’s task is, where required, to monitor such persons and circles in order to see whether they violate the law or are about to do so. The aim is to prevent that terrorist acts will be planned and carried out in Denmark or that Denmark will be used as a basis of support for the planning or implementation of terrorist acts in other places in the world. In this connection, Europe is still considered central in the radical Islamists’ attempts to recruit sympathisers and set up logistic support points for acts to be committed.

As previously mentioned, as to the terrorist threat, PET focuses on the monitoring and investigation of groups and individuals in a number of more or less extremist circles.

Some sympathise with or have direct relations to international terrorist organisations. For example, the monitoring concerns North African organisations like Groupe Islamique Combatant Marocain (GICM), Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) or Groupe Islamique Combattant Libyen (GICL), Middle Eastern terrorist groups like Osbat Al Ansar or Takfir Wal Hijra, the Iraqi Ansar Al Islam (Al Sunna) and Al Tawhid (Tawhid Wal Jihad). PET also focuses on the world-embracing Muslim organisation Hizb-ut-Tahrir; this is due to the concern that Hizb-ut-Tahrir, through the organisation’s clear dissociation from the Danish democracy and western values and norms in general, might contribute to further influence...
"IT IS PET’S IMPRESSION, WHICH IS BASED ON AN INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, THAT THE ARRESTS CONTRIBUTED TO INTERRUPTING A CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT MIGHT HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A PROPER TERRORIST ACT."

individuals residing in Denmark in a more Islamic, radicalised militant direction.

For one thing, this concern should be seen in the light of the fact that Hizb-ut-Tahrir attempts to recruit members, among other places, in high schools, continuation schools and business colleges, not only among well educated young individuals but also among young and socially marginalised males affiliated to criminal circles. Other persons and circles attract the attention of the Service because of specific acts or because they share the same radical, Islamic ideological conviction, even though they are not necessarily affiliated to known international terrorist movements or networks.

These intensified surveillance efforts initiated against known radical individuals, circles and mosques will, obviously, continue. Likewise, on the basis of the current threat environment, more focus is brought on identifying unknown but potential terrorists, c.f. the description of the different categories in chapter 1. Naturally, the overall aim is to uncover the planning of possible terrorist activities in Denmark and activities leading to the suspicion that subscriptions of funds for terrorism, calls for and recruitment of persons for terrorist purposes take place, in Iraq for instance, and support to terror related activities abroad.

In this context, a male of Moroccan origin, domiciled in Denmark, was arrested in September 2005 and charged with violation of Section 114b of the Danish Criminal Code for having called for Jihad. This section makes illegal any form of support to terrorist organisations or organisations facilitating terrorist acts, even if this support cannot be referred to specific terrorist acts. The arrest was made following surveillance effected by the Service for quite some time. The individual concerned remains in custody and the question whether a charge will be brought against him is being assessed by the Prosecution.

Likewise, PET’s investigation also led to the arrests on 27 October 2005 by the police in Glostrup of four young individuals in a terror case. This case is connected with arrests in Bosnia, where two persons, one of whom is a young Turkish national born and raised in Denmark, were arrested in possession of explosives and weapons, etc. PET had monitored those who were arrested in Denmark for quite some time. The four individuals remain in custody in the case, which is still being investigated. Thus, even though no charge has been brought against the accused and no sentence has been passed yet, it is PET’s impression, which is based on an intelligence assessment, that the arrests contributed to interrupting a chain of events that might have developed into a proper terrorist act.

This case also more generally demonstrates the problem that an intelligence service faces: the question of when the Service must intervene in a case where it is suspected that a terrorist act, for instance, is being planned. PET must prevent, investigate and counter undertakings and acts and, obviously, the aim is to intervene in time, before the act is committed. On the other hand, this means that the earlier the Service intervenes and disrupts a chain of events, the more likely the risk of finding only little evidence and, thus, the risk that a case does not have the legal outcome that it would have had had the Service waited longer.

In recent years, PET has further increased the monitoring of groups and individuals in Denmark that might be suspected of supporting the forces that are currently fighting the Coalition Forces in Iraq and who attempt to prevent the institution of democracy in Iraq. This investi-
The terrorist acts committed on 7 July 2005 in the British capital, obviously, gave rise to drastically increased activities within the Service.

PET immediately intensified its contacts to liaisons and followed the events in London hour by hour. It was of utmost importance that a general view was quickly formed of the impact of the events on Denmark. Thus, the investigation and monitoring of radical circles and individuals were further intensified in order to uncover any connections with the persons and circles responsible for the bomb attacks in London. Moreover, with the purpose of assessing whether acts of terrorism were being planned or actually being carried out in Denmark, PET activated sources within various circles. Furthermore, PET initiated a long series of preventive talks with a number of individuals within Muslim circles, among other places. The aim was to sense the temperature within the different circles, whether, for instance, individuals in these circles knew about possible responses following the terrorist acts in London, including whether there might be signs in Denmark that preparations were being made for similar actions. Furthermore, PET wanted to let groups and persons within more radical circles know that the Service was aware of their activities.

One of the more specific and visible initiatives taken by the Service was the substantially increased police presence at relevant buildings, interests and traffic junctions which was carried into effect in co-operation with the Copenhagen Police and a number of other major police districts. At the same time, PET was in close and regular contact with all Danish police districts who, immediately following the London acts, were requested to be more alert concerning all relevant information, incidents and episodes. Moreover, the police districts should contact those responsible for the infrastructural junctions, e.g. airports, ports, ferry services, railway stations, etc. The aim of this co-operation was to ensure that these places also paid increased attention to events, individuals and circumstances that might appear suspicious.
PET also took steps to ensure that the Danish Civil Aviation Administration, DSB and Banedanmark (Rail Net Denmark), the Metro among many others, made the necessary decisions related to security and attention. Furthermore, the public and private counter-terrorist contact group was summoned and informed of the situation. Likewise, the Service appealed to the public through the media encouraging the public to be more alert to situations that might appear suspicious.

Generally speaking, the request to be more alert has proved very effective in the population. After the terror attacks in London, PET received markedly more information from the public. It is PET's assessment that this increase generally indicates a very active population and that the message requesting people to be more attentive is taken serious, a fact that might contribute to the prevention of terrorist acts being committed in Denmark.

These events are typically as follows:
- Suspicious photographing at infrastructural junctions – the Metro, railways, airports, ferries etc.
- Suspicious behaviour in general at the same places.
- Suspicious behaviour of foreign neighbours – particularly when many foreign guests meet at their premises.
- Suspicious travel behaviour when travelling to special countries.
- Sudden religious awareness – conversion to Islam – changes from western to Middle Eastern clothing, behaviour and rhetorics, growth of beard.
The London experience

The terror acts in London added a number of new intelligence aspects to the image of the terror threat that the European countries have had to deal with in recent years.

Generally speaking, the case underlines that terrorist acts can take place without warning, thus, without any indications of intelligence nature or any other kinds of indications. The London terrorist acts also showed that it is possible to carry out such actions with high precision and effectiveness on basis of a short planning phase and limited operational capacity.

The subsequent investigation effected by the British authorities also showed that several of the perpetrators were well educated and, apparently, well functioning and well integrated in the British society. Some were born and raised in the country and had not previously attracted the authorities’ attention. Most of the terrorists had not been markedly religious before becoming involved in a radicalisation process, and they did not practise their religion in the established mosque circles. In other words, they did not show any particular signs of having been attracted by a radical, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, not even in the company of their family or their circle of acquaintances. Moreover, they had undergone a process in which the Internet, too, played an important part as a source of inspiration and base knowledge, including in connection with the making of explosives.

Furthermore, the London attacks also accentuated the importance of a well-functioning and co-ordinated co-operation between the various authorities carrying out the investigation, including and in particular between the intelligence services and the national police.

More specifically, it also became clear to the British authorities that, simply to ensure the necessary peace for the investigation, it was essential that all approaches coming from next-of-kin, citizens and the press were handled by other authorities but the police and security services.

On the basis of the British experience, PET has obtained extensive knowledge. This knowledge has now made the Danish police able to reassess and adjust existing plans on how to prevent and handle terrorist acts in Denmark.

The experience from London has also been entered in the cross-ministerial committee that was set up in August 2005 and given the task of assessing the total Danish anti-terror preparedness. (please see page 21).

The Parliamentary report on the London bombs

On 11 May 2006, the British Parliament’s “Intelligence and Security Committee” (which to a certain extent can be compared to the Danish Parliament’s Control Committee) published its “Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005”. The report pinpoints a series of intelligence and security related aspects in connection with the London bombs. Below are mentioned some of the most important “lessons learned” that the report concludes from the terrorist acts in London.

On the whole, the report appreciates that the British security and intelligence services have managed to prevent several terrorist acts but, due to lacking resources and, consequently, prioritisation of other cases, including the unraveling and averting of recognised plans to commit terrorist acts, they did not manage to prevent the terrorist acts from being carried out on 7 July 2005.
Among other things, it is concluded in the report that two of the perpetrators had slightly caught the attention of the British intelligence service before the terrorist acts on 7 July – in connection with other ongoing surveillance operations – but at the time the Service did not attach great importance to them. Due to lack of resources, it was decided to direct the attention towards more urgent cases. It is alleged in the report that the chances of preventing the terrorist acts committed on 7 July would have been higher had the British security service ranked the investigation of these two individuals higher on the list of priorities. On the other hand, seen in the light of the prioritisation of other urgent cases and the lack of resources, the prioritisation was understandable.

Moreover, the British report points to the development on the so-called “home-grown threat”. In this connection, the report stresses the essentiality of bringing to the authorities involved in countering terrorism a common and thorough understanding of the potential radicalisation – both the broadness, the speed and the degree – of the persons, who were born and raised in Great Britain.

In addition, the report points to the importance of a closer co-operation both nationally between the services and with foreign security and intelligence services. Furthermore, the report concludes that higher chances of preventing possible terrorist acts are possible only if the British services increase their surveillance and intelligence activities. Despite of such increase, it will still not be possible to prevent all terrorist acts from taking place.

Besides illustrating the role of the intelligence and security services, the British parliamentary report should also be seen as a way of closing the case – for the next-of-kin, among others.

Since the individuals behind the bombs were suicide terrorists, it is, logically, impossible to unfold the whole chain of events in court and demand that justice be done and in this way reach a redeeming turningpoint, which court cases often reflect, too. By publishing details from the investigation in the report and telling the story of the events before, during and after the terrorist acts, in this way, the British authorities have attempted to contribute to an out of court, judicial redemption to the tragedy. Thus, the following can be read in the report:

**THE MORNING OF 7 JULY**

July 2005 in the UK started with a strongly positive feel. On 6 July London won the competition to host the 2012 Olympic Games. A few days earlier the Live 8 concerts had sent an unprecedentedly powerful message to world leaders about poverty in Africa. On 7 July, G8 leaders were meeting in Gleneagles.

7 July began unsettled, with heavy showers in places. The early morning rush in London started as normal. There were some delays that morning on the Underground, including – significantly – on the Northern Line. Then, at about 8.50am there
were 3 almost simultaneous explosions – the first in a Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations, the second on the Circle Line just outside Edgware Road and the third in a Piccadilly Line tunnel between King’s Cross and Russell Square. At 9.47am, there was a fourth explosion on the upper deck of a no 30 bus in Tavistock Square. 56 people, including the bombers, died in the attacks and more than 700 were injured.

06.49 the 4 men get out of their respective cars, look in the boots of both, and appear to move items between them. They each put on rucksacks which CCTV shows are large and full. The 4 are described as looking as if they were going on a camping holiday. One car contained explosive devices of a different and smaller kind from those in the rucksacks. It is not clear what they were for, but they may have been for self-defence or diversion in case of interception during the journey given their size; that they were in the car rather than the boot; and that they were left behind. Also left in the Micra were other items consistent with the use of explosives. A 9mm handgun was also found in the Brava. The Micra had a day parking ticket in the window, perhaps to avoid attention, the Brava did not.

Example of an investigative chain of events in connection with the reception of a threat

A terror threat is received in the form of a report or it appears on a website from which place it is distributed to a wider circle of people.

Subsequently, the Counter Terrorism Division assesses which immediate investigative steps should be taken.

If necessary, the Department for Technical Support and IT Investigations will be activated and the agent runners will be informed with a view to activating their sources.

The initial investigation focuses on establishing the source of the threat. A typical investigative step is the retrieval of one or more court orders.

If any names can be identified, searches will immediately be carried out in the various records. Enquiries will be prepared for liaisons in Denmark and abroad.

Any data received will be regularly assessed in order to decide on further steps. Obviously, this might lead to demands that further telephone interceptions be carried out, that liaisons be activated and that passenger lists and visa records be checked, etc.

In addition, often a co-operation is initiated with the local police responsible for the object/area pertinent to the threat. The local police will constantly be informed of the level of threat, any measures taken and be advised on how to counteract the threat, etc.

In a number of cases, irrespective of all relevant investigative measures having been initiated, it will prove impossible to uncover the nature of the threat.
Threats made on the Internet, received as text messages, etc.

In the wake of the London bombs, Denmark, like a number of other European countries, became the object of a very long series of more or less unspecific threats, which typically appeared on the Internet or were received as text messages with warnings on terrorist acts. The chain of events in connection with these threats seems to follow the same pattern that was seen following other previous terrorist attacks, where different groups or individuals use a specific terrorist act to intimidate the population by threatening to commit further acts of terrorism. Often the people behind the threats claim to belong to the al-Qaeda network, and the media are usually very apt at labelling them as such.

For instance, following the terrorist acts in London, a group calling themselves the Abu Hafs al-Masri-Brigades made threats against a number of European countries, including Denmark. The person or persons making up the above group is/are known for making various threats and for having claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist acts and other events in which it was clear that these had nothing to do with terrorism, for instance the huge power failure in New York in 2005. It is PET’s general assessment that the Abu Hafs al-Masri-Brigades do not pose a real threat in themselves.

The messages that could be seen in the form of text messages and e-mails for instance at the beginning of September 2005 are further examples of a series of unspecified threats/warnings on imminent terrorist acts in Copenhagen. As for the specific threats, PET suggested via the media that any person who received such a threat should contact the police and refrain from passing on the message.

It goes without saying that it is often difficult to determine to what extent such threats should be assessed real and whether the individuals or groups behind dispose of actual operative capacity. Nevertheless, PET considers the various threats and other incidents of a similar kind very seriously and focuses, in cooperation with its liaisons, on tracking the individuals behind. In several cases, the Service has tracked down such senders with success. Such threats could constitute a violation of Section 266 of the Danish Criminal Code and might contribute to the creation of fear and give an erroneous picture of a specific imminent terror threat. As regards the Internet threats, they could also contribute to inspiring other groups, who might dispose of the necessary operative capacity, to carry out terrorist attacks against the countries in question. Thus, in a sense, the Internet contributes to maintaining the countries mentioned on the terrorists’ “map of the world”.

As mentioned, it is the aim of the Service – in collaboration with the national police and its liaisons – to clarify the circumstances surrounding each of the terror threats in order to assess its nature and possible influence on the level of threat in Denmark. The fact box (please see the inserted box) illustrates how a case involving threats begins in the Service’s so-called “response team” and quickly involves major parts of the Service.

Powder letters

During 2005, a number of public institutions and private individuals have received anonymous powder letters. The Service knows of more than
20 different incidents of this kind. So far, none of the letters have contained traces of anthrax or other dangerous substances.

Following the anthrax cases in the United States in 2001, a more formalised co-operation between Danish police, Danish Defence, the National Centre for Biological Defence, the Danish Emergency Management Agency and the National Board of Health was established. PET is regularly kept informed of the cases in order to assess whether a specific threat exists.

In August 2005, a 35-year-old woman was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment on the basis of the Service’s investigation, she was convicted in the Copenhagen City Court of violation against a civil servant and of sending a series of powder letters to the Danish Prime Minister’s Office and the Danish Embassy in Vienna, among other places.

Terror financing

In order to strengthen the investigation in the terror-financing field, the Service has established a close co-operation with the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime (SØK). For instance, a project group has been set up between SØK and the Service with the purpose of mapping possible terror financial networks in Denmark.

As a consequence of the increasing importance of this particular field, a specific division within the Service’s terror section, the so-called Tefine section (Terror Financial Networks) was set up. This section engages in investigation involving suspected violation of Section 114a of the Danish Criminal Code, which concerns terror financing. The section co-operates with a number of other institutions, including banks, PBS (Payment Business Services), Skat (the Danish Customs and Tax Authorities), SØK, Danish airports – through which attempts to transfer substantial amounts of money are regularly made – and the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency.

During the period 2004–2005, this section has visited a number of companies. Likewise, actions have been carried out in Kastrup and Billund Airports in order to check luggage and persons. In the same way, checks have been carried out of flight cargoes and freight companies in Kastrup Airport. In addition, this section has effected similar actions in the border area in e.g. Rødby Ferry Port. Based on information from PET, the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime was able to charge two members from the Al Aqsa Association for having subscribed funds for the military branch of the Palestinian organisation Hamas, which is suspected of being connected with terrorism.

In December 2005, a charge was brought in the case when the Danish Minister of Justice concurred with the Public Prosecutor’s decision on an initiation of legal proceedings.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

The aim of the Service’s investigation on non-proliferation is to collect, treat and analyse information with the purpose of forming a general view of the countries that might be suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction and to find out which persons/groups are active, how they work and which types of products they might request about. In 2004–2005, the Service gave lectures to companies, industrial organisations i.e. and carried out awareness campaigns at a number of universities and other institutions of higher education in Denmark.

The effort against crime of non-proliferation nature presupposes a broad co-operation with a large number of authorities. Therefore, the
Service co-operates closely with the National Agency for Enterprise and Construction, the Confederation of Danish Industries, the Danish Customs and Tax Authorities (Skat), the Danish Defence Intelligence Security, the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the National Centre for Biological Defence, Chemical Defence, the business world in general and, obviously, the Danish national police. On an international level, the Service co-operates with Europol and in international control regimes such as the Australian Group, Wassenaar, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

In addition, the non-proliferation department within the Service has also investigated a case involving IT equipment export to a country that is subject to export restrictions. During the investigation, it was established that a number of persons were possibly involved, and late in the autumn an approach was made in co-operation with the local police to the exporting company. Subsequently, the main suspects behind were charged with violation of Section 114e of the Danish Criminal Code and the company was searched. The case has not yet been settled, but it is expected that a sentence will be pronounced during 2006.

Project: “Police against terrorism”
With the project “Police against terrorism” the Service intends to involve the national police further in its targeted efforts to prevent terrorist acts. This project was initiated during the autumn of 2005 and consists, in broad outline, of a further activation and involvement of the police districts in the fight against terrorism. The aim is to expand police competence with regard to the execution of the day-to-day police work in order to strengthen the total Danish police force thus enabling it to increasingly being able to spot terror-related indications or activities. However, the purpose of this project is also to pave the way for a broad counter-terrorism co-operation between the individual police district and its local liaisons in order to restrain radicalisation processes etc.

With a view to ensuring a prompt and efficient treatment of the above information, an electronic report system has been set up. In this way, the police districts can send information on indications, activities etc. directly to the Service’s counter-terrorism division.

The project is directed towards both the uniformed police and the criminal police since increased attention with regard to terror-related indications or activities might prove relevant in all forms of police tasks. During the autumn of 2005, the Service has visited the police districts with the purpose of presenting the project. Subsequently, the Service has initiated a focused information effort within these districts. The initiative is intended to contribute to establishing an understanding of the processes that could lead to radicalisation, including which indicators that might lead to suspicion and thus should result in further
investigation being effected by the police. In each police district a so-called “trainer” has been singled out who has followed an intensive training course within the Service. By means of instructional materials developed by the Service, the task of this “trainer” is to ensure that the project is rooted in the local police districts and communicated to the individual police officer through a “train-the-trainer”-course directed at all police employees in the individual districts.

The above indicators that might lead to suspicion are mentioned in a so-called “Action card”, which is distributed to all police officers in Denmark.

A number of chief constables have participated in the development of the project “police against terrorism” to ensure the highest possible operationality and utility. This companion group will attend the preliminary evaluation of the project some time during 2006. It is expected that a complete evaluation of “Police against terrorism” will be carried out at the end of 2006.

Co-operation with the aliens authorities

As part of the so-called “anti-terror package”, an amendment of the Danish Aliens Act was made, among other reasons to provide an opportunity for strengthening the security and intelligence services’ co-operation with the aliens authorities. This modification made it possible for the aliens authorities to pass on information to PET and DDIS should a specific case be assessed to be of security or intelligence related importance to the work of the services. In particular, the co-operation within the aliens related field must ensure that foreigners, about whom it should be presumed that they could pose a threat to national security, are not granted legal stay in Denmark.

On the basis of information received from the Danish Immigration Service, PET assesses whether a person should be considered to pose a threat to national security on the basis of the wording in the Danish Aliens Act. Should this be the case, PET will inform the Danish Minister of Justice accordingly. On the basis of this assessment, the Minister of Justice will make a report to the Minister of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Subsequently, the assessment from the above Minister will provide the basis for the decision to be made by the aliens authorities concerning whether the individual in question must be denied stay in Denmark. It is not possible to appeal to a higher administrative authority a decision that a person should be regarded as a threat to national security.

In addition, on the basis of a report from the Ministry of Justice, the Minister for Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs can also decide that the information that has led to the assessment that an alien should be assessed as a threat to national security must not be passed on to the alien him-/herself, his or her representative or the aliens authority that is to make a final decision in the case. Thus, the alien cannot claim reasons for any denial.

Furthermore, the co-operation with the aliens authorities must ensure that the Service is provided with information on persons who otherwise would be of interest to the Service. For instance, these are individuals about whom the Service – due to its responsibility for the internal security – need to know that they are present in Denmark, including explosives experts, persons connected with terrorist organisations or who sympathise with such organisations or persons affiliated to intelligence services in other countries etc. In these cases, the investigation of the Service could consist of keeping up-to-date of the circle of
acquaintances, behaviour pattern etc. of the person concerned. The reason for this is that the person in question may not be directly regarded as a threat to national security at the present time but could, in future, become regarded as such. In this case, the residence permit must be withdrawn. As a result of the changes, an alien’s secretariat has been set up within the Service’s counter-terrorism division for the handling of the aliens’ cases.

Number of aliens’ cases according to type in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case type</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum cases</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence cases</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa screenings</td>
<td>3,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN quota cases</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of the recent amendment of the Danish legislation, information is not publicly available on the number of cases in which a residence permit has been denied or in which it has been established that there was information of intelligence interest. However, once a year the Control Committee of the Danish Parliament is informed of the cases in which the regulations have been applied.

Conference on terror – “The Roots of Terrorism in Europe”

On 2 and 3 May 2005, PET for the second time in the Service’s history organised and hosted an international conference. The theme of the conference was “The Roots of Terrorism in Europe”. The aim of the conference was to contribute towards increasing the roots or growth potential of terrorism seen in a European context, also applying to Danish conditions.
The conference primarily appealed to politicians, police officers, researchers, civil and public servants, Danish and foreign intelligence security officers as well as journalists and representatives from the Muslim societies in Denmark.

The following gave speeches:

• Ahmed Abu-Laban, a prominent Imam affiliated to the Islamic Community in Denmark
• Dr phil. Jørgen Bæk Simonsen, professor at the Carsten Niebuhr Institute at the University of Copenhagen and Director of the Danish Institute in Damascus
• Dr Gilles Kepel, professor at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris (IEP)
• Dr Thomas Scheffler, professor of political science at the Freie Universität in Berlin and a visiting lecturer at the Carsten Niebuhr Institute at the University of Copenhagen
• Petter Nesser, researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

• Azza Karam, Senior Policy Research Advisor at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
• Hans Jørgen Bonnichsen, Commander, Head of Operations, PET

On the basis of the theme of the conference, the Danish and international distinguished speakers gave their contributions to the problems and issues concerning Islamic radicalisation and terrorism. The conference had three main issues or questions: Why and when does radicalisation start? How is radicalisation expressed? And how do you consider the possibilities of fighting the roots of terrorism, when these roots are part of our own society?

It is generally believed that radicalisation is an essential element in the roots of terrorism and it is therefore necessary to gain a particular insight and knowledge of radicalisation in order to strengthen the preventive efforts within this field. The speakers at the conference contributed with expert knowledge and many problems and issues were discussed and gave rise to productive thoughts and considerations for further activities. A summary of the conference is available as Appendix H.
Security and Operations Division
The Security and Operations Division is responsible for a number of investigational support tasks such as surveillance, technical support, security related assignments and personal protection.

Surveillance
The surveillance unit is a crucial support function in connection with the intelligence-related activities of the Service. The surveillance unit shadows targets and carries out regular surveillance tasks of a varying nature, difficult photo assignments, reconnaissance in connection with secret searches and the installation of interception equipment et cetera.

Besides the ordinary surveillance teams it is also possible to establish units that are experts on solutions with focus on specific surveillance tasks, technology, arrests, personal protection for high-risk targets, and assistance for the anti-terror emergency management authorities – including the Special Operations and Response Team (AKS).

As previously mentioned substantial parts of the Danish National Centre of Investigative Support (NEC) will be transferred to PET some time during the summer of 2006. This also includes the part of NEC, which handles surveillance and monitoring, and following the transfer this group will be joining the Service’s surveillance capacity.

Technical Support
PET’s technical intelligence support unit performs IT tasks and other forms of technical assistance in connection with surveillance and investigation just as it is also responsible for keeping the Service up-to-date on the technical development within these fields.

The core area for the technical support unit is to establish different kinds of interception, including interceptions of Internet and e-mail accounts, video surveillance and specific photo assignments. In addition to this there are sweeping assignments, i.e. to check whether interception equipment, weapons, explosives et cetera have been placed in sensitive locations such as ministries, embassies, ministerial cars and residences.

The technical support function furthermore assists the operational divisions in connection with secret searches including opening doors, securing data and the possible installation of
"TODAY THE SERVICE, THEREFORE, USES A CONSIDERABLY LARGER PART OF ITS RESOURCES ON PERSONAL PROTECTION COMPARED WITH JUST A FEW YEARS AGO."

interception equipment. In addition to that the unit also helps with the secret opening of letters.

Concurrently with the technological development, this function has been provided new and up-to-date equipment in recent years. Among other things it has thus been necessary to replace analogue interception equipment with digital equipment, just as it has also been necessary to establish an extensive system for the handling of Internet interceptions.

The Co-ordinating Security Unit.
The division also holds a co-ordinating security unit which handles security-related tasks primarily related to “the public Denmark”; this includes the Royal Family, the Government, various ministries and administrative bodies, the Danish Parliament and its members, the Armed Forces, and foreign diplomatic representations in Denmark. The co-ordinating security unit gathers and continuously assesses information – among other things through a daily contact with the above institutions – concerning the security-related status of the institutions in question. Based on this the co-ordinating security unit elaborates recommendations for specific security measures.

The co-ordinating security unit also assesses the security-related need in connection with state visits, conferences and similar events and initiates the necessary security measures either alone and/or in co-operation with the national police.

In recent years, the co-ordinating security unit has established an increasing demand for security-related measures in connection with persons or institutions that previously have needed no – or only little – advisory or direct initiation of security-related measures, including personal protection.

Personal Protection Officers
PET’s Personal Protection Officers (PPOs) protect members of the Royal Family and guests of the Royal Family, members of Government, certain politicians and other leading Danish public figures. Furthermore, personal protection is offered to ambassadors and, to some extent, prominent foreign guests. In consequence of the development with regard to the general threat image and on account of several incidents, personal protection has proved an ever-increasing task for the Service. At the same time, in consequence of the development as to the threat image and the development which has taken place within this field in a number of other countries, the Service does not expect that the need for personal protection in Denmark will be reduced in the years to come. A steadily increasing number of persons are under the protection of the Service. Permanent personal protection of one person needs, to begin with, a team of approximately 12 PPOs. Lately – and in particular following the “Cartoon Case” – the Service has established an escalated number of threats and threat-related incidents against public figures. Today the Service, therefore, uses a considerably larger part of its resources on personal protection compared with just a few years ago.

A security unit that mainly handles surveillance tasks of a more stationary nature supports the personal protection unit.

Despite an increase in the number of PPOs, the estimated overtime has gone up markedly during 2004 and 2005, cf. the above.

The Danish General Election 2005
The general election to the Danish Parliament on 8 February 2005 was surrounded with more security measures than ever before in connection with previous elections in Denmark.
This was due to a wide range of facts which – according to PET’s assessment – meant that it was obliged to increase the overall security level.

First and foremost, it is a well-known fact that the terror threat against the West has been raised following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. A threat that became even more obvious when terrorists set off a number of bombs in trains in the Spanish capital Madrid on 11 March 2004.

The circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks in Madrid and the subsequent events played an important part as to the assessment of the domestic security situation and the security-related measures which were taken in connection with the Danish general election.

As you might know, the terrorist attacks in Madrid took place shortly before the parliamentary election in Spain where one of the central issues of the election campaign had been the Spanish military involvement in the US-led Coalition in Iraq. It was the assessment of many that part of the motive for the bombings was the Spanish military participation in Iraq. Even though it subsequently became known that the terrorist attacks in Madrid were being planned even before Spain decided to send soldiers to Iraq, several observers pointed out that the course of events within terrorist circles could be interpreted in such a way that the terrorist attack was the direct reason why Spain left the Coalition. Others have pointed to the fact that the debate, which took place during the election campaign concerning the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, in itself may have been decisive to the Spanish terrorist cell choosing to carry out its attacks so close on the election in order to influence the future government to withdraw its troops.

In connection with the election in Denmark, it was therefore obviously taken into consideration that terrorists in Europe might have been given the impression that they – through a terrorist attack against e.g. civilian soft targets – could influence the result of the election in a country that was also militarily involved in Iraq and thus persuade the country to end its participation. At the same time there had also been a discussion in Denmark prior to and during the election as to whether Denmark was to withdraw
its troops from Iraq. Besides, the Danish involvement in Iraq has contributed to creating an increased awareness of Denmark as an active partner in the fight against international terrorism. Among other things, Denmark has been mentioned several times as the target of threats made on the Internet where precisely the Danish involvement in Iraq has been mentioned as a reason for the threats.

It was also included in the threat assessment that Denmark’s recent membership of the UN Security Council and the coming Chairmanship for the UN Counter-Terrorism Council could have contributed to a further exposure of Denmark’s involvement in the fight against international terrorism, thus possibly profiling Denmark as an attractive target for terrorism.
"THUS, IT WAS THE GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THREAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE FEBRUARY ELECTION HAD INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS ELECTION IN NOVEMBER 2001."

Furthermore, it was also part of the security-related considerations in connection with the election that extremist individual acts could imply a risk of escalating the conflict in society. This was manifested in connection with the killing of the Dutch film director Theodor van Gogh and the subsequent reactions that e.g. resulted in arson attacks against a number of mosques.

In this connection it has more generally been possible to trace a development in a number of Western countries where both radical Islamists and people from the extreme right are deliberately speculating in provoking actions and threats which might incite a confrontation between cultures and religions.

Another focus point was whether people from the extreme right and left might use the election to carry out activities e.g. in connection with the debate on Denmark’s military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and on the immigration issue. It could not be ruled out either that especially the activities of politicians with an immigrant background could be met with harassment from the extreme right wing.

Thus, it was the general assessment that the overall level of threat in connection with the February election had increased substantially compared to the previous election in November 2001.

On this background, a high level of both active and passive security was established in close co-operation with the Copenhagen Police; this level was maintained throughout the entire election campaign and until the count of votes had been completed. It was the assignment of the Service to accomplish the different PPO tasks in relation to members of Government and other politicians who needed personal protection. In addition, the Service prepared current risk assessments that provided a basis for the specific visible and invisible security measures during the election. Furthermore, the Service had a close co-operation with the Copenhagen Police in connection with the highly extensive planning and co-ordination of the overall security surrounding the many election meetings and other public events in connection with the general election.

The election within the election
At the same time Denmark had been singled out as one of the countries in Europe where exile Iraqis would have the opportunity to vote in the election for the Iraqi transitional Government. This was an event which was to take place in Taastrup from 29 to 31 January 2006 – right in the middle of the national election campaign – and obviously it had a considerable impact on the security-related considerations particularly seen in the light of the massive international focus on the fact that this was the first Iraqi election after the fall of Saddam Hussein and because the election in Iraq had been the target of several terrorist attacks of a varying nature. It was PET’s assessment that the Iraqi
election in Denmark might constitute an attractive target for terrorists as the event received a great deal of media attention and because it was expected that more than 15,000 persons would cast their vote at the same location. At the same time, a terrorist attack against the Iraqi election in Denmark could have been instrumental in destabilising the Danish election campaign, cf. the above. That is the reason why PET – in close co-operation with the Copenhagen Police – established maximum-security measures around the Iraqi election. Among other things this meant that all access roads leading to the location, where the voting was to take place, were barricaded with concrete blocks just as armed police carried out extensive admittance and security checks in connection with the polling place in order to make sure that only persons, who had a legal right to be there, were given access.
Visit to Denmark by the President of the United States George W. Bush on 5 and 6 July 2005 was an enormous task for the Danish Police and for the Service.

A visit by an American president will always be surrounded by vast security measures. Add to this the generally increased level of threat in the Western World that in particular applies to the United States and American interests.

The central position of the United States in the fight against terrorism, including its military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, has meant that particularly Islamist terrorists from all over the world see the United States as their main enemy today.

Furthermore, there is a strong opposition within left-wing extremist circles in Denmark against the United States and George Bush in particular because of the current foreign policy of the country. Within extreme left-wing circles, the President is generally perceived as a personification of the American foreign policy and his visit to Copenhagen could therefore be seen as an obvious opportunity to carry out actions, happenings at central aimed at the President and/or American interests in Denmark.

In that connection there were certain indications that foreign operators would be coming to Copenhagen in connection with the visit of President Bush. At the same time, the Service was also very aware of the fact that possible actions at central could due to the high level of security surrounding the President’s visit very well be turned against targets such as symbols of the United States and American influence.

Moreover, there is a strong opposition against the United States and American interests in the fight against terrorism, including its military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has meant that particularly Islamist terrorists from all over the world see the United States as their main enemy today.

On this basis, maximum police-related security measures had been established and as the Service obviously was involved in the planning of the visit.

The Service has been involved in and responsible for the most extensive security operations the Service has been involved in and responsible for. It was one of the most extensive security operations the Service has been involved in and responsible for.
"IN THIS CONNECTION PET WENT TO THE PRESS URGING PEOPLE NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANYTHING THAT COULD MEAN AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT. THE APPEAL ALSO POINTED OUT THAT BY PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITIES MENTIONED YOU COULD RUN THE RISK OF BECOMING A PART OF VIOLENT OR EXTREME FORCES' ATTEMPT TO ADD FURTHER FUEL TO THE FIRE."

extensive planning of the many different security measures.

Apart from PET’s Counter-terrorism and Extremism Divisions and the Operational Analysis Unit, it was the Security and Operations Division in particular that was involved in the specific security tasks and also in the very extensive planning that took place in the months prior to the visit. This meant, among other things, that it was necessary to place former PPOs on active service. Especially the transport of the President from Fredensborg Castle to Mønster Castle, where George W. Bush had talks with Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was a task filled with great security-related challenges. First and foremost, it was necessary to ensure that the President’s motorcade, 41 vehicles in all, could advance unhindered. This meant that all other forms of traffic on the route were forbidden during those periods of time when the motorcade was driving to and from Fredensborg Castle. Secondly, measures had been established which were to prevent assassination attempts against the President and his retinue, and among other things this

implied that sewers, roadsides and a number of locations had been swept for bombs and other suspicious items and that sharpshooters and other special forces had been placed in strategic places both inside the motorcade and in those areas where the President was staying.

PPOs from the Service joined forces with staff from the Secret Service to protect President Bush, his family and those individuals in the retinue who needed personal protection.

As you will know the Presidential visit passed off in a peaceful manner and completely according to plan, and both the American authorities and the numerous Danish authorities involved in the visit expressed great satisfaction with the way the security had been handled during the visit.

The Iraqi Parliamentary Election in December 2005

Just as during the Iraqi election in Denmark in February 2005, this election was also covered by extensive security-related measures.

Approximately 16,000 Iraqis living in Denmark had the opportunity to vote at the Bella Center. PET had the task of preparing threat assessments and participating in the co-ordination of the massive security measures which had been established inside and around the polling place. As you will know, the election in Denmark took place in a calm and orderly manner, and despite the security measures, it turned out to be a joyful and festive occasion for many of the people voting.

The Cartoon Case

On 30 September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten published a number of cartoons depicting the Prophet and this provoked a number of reactions both in Denmark and
abroad, particularly in the Middle East and in a number of big Muslim countries. One thing is that the publication of the cartoons was widely regarded as an unnecessary insult against Muslims and thus resulted in various peaceful reactions. Another thing is that a number of extremist religious movements in e.g. the Middle East have made threats against Denmark and offered rewards to anyone who might kill the cartoonists and other related persons. Based on this, a number of security-related measures were established in connection with persons and interests in Denmark.

The case had the effect that a negative focus was placed on Denmark and Danish interests in other countries and as known the reactions escalated drastically abroad within a few days, including attacks against Danish embassies, flag burnings, and threats against Danish nationals in the Middle East. The intense focus on Denmark was also reflected in the striking increase in the number of threats against Denmark in general, and against individuals, organisations and companies.

A further security-related worry was to what extent the crisis would provoke reactions in Denmark that could contribute to escalating the situation and the reactions abroad. Among other things text messages were circulated in Denmark in which right-wing extremist forces called for setting the Koran on fire at a number of different occasions, just as second and third generation immigrant circles started sending text messages which called for countermeasures if a Koran was set on fire.

In this connection PET went to the press urging people not to participate in anything that could mean an escalation of the conflict. The appeal also pointed out that by participating in the activities mentioned you could run the risk of...
becoming a part of violent or extreme forces’ attempt to add further fuel to the fire.

During the entire course of events, PET was in close contact with the Copenhagen Police and other police districts where demonstrations and happenings related to the cartoons took place. The aim was to make sure that the demonstrations took place in a peaceful manner and to avoid actions which could escalate the situation, for example burnings of the Koran.

Furthermore, PET met with the group of Imams with whom there had been regular contact for a number of years. At the meeting the Imams emphasised that they themselves would actively do their part to prevent the situation from escalating further and that they would do their best to help keeping the peace in Denmark out of consideration for the Danish society, including the Muslim part of the population.

During the cartoon case, PET also carried out numerous preventive interviews with individuals from radical Muslim circles and leading figures from the extreme right, the purpose being to warn them against inciting to a further escalation of the conflict.

On a more overall basis, PET also contacted the Danish police districts in connection with the case to repeat the request for increased awareness which, among other things, was given to the districts following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. Most recently, the Service has also established a number of preventive and constructive awareness measures in order to increase the resistance within society in the face of the increased terror threat.

Security and openness
In recent years, it has been established that there is an ever increasing interest from the media when it comes to the security measures which often surrounds events such as those described previously. However, PET is generally very cautious when talking about both specific and more overall circumstances that in a security-related context are relevant both prior to and during the events.

Obviously this is due to the fact that the Service does not wish to provide information to persons or groups that might use this to plan criminal acts that fall within PET’s area of responsibility. Similarly, investigative circumstances and the consideration for co-operational partners will often play a part when it comes to the degree of openness.

At the same time, the Service does not wish to contribute to placing media focus on the security-related aspects of a given event as it cannot be ruled out that such a focus might actually inspire or provoke specific actions with the purpose of attracting the attention of the media. Unnecessary comments on risks and security-related considerations may furthermore have the effect that the public, to an unduly extent, will not participate in the event due to the fear and worry which has occurred as a consequence of the publicity.

Counter-extremism
One of PET’s main tasks is to survey and when necessary to prevent that groups or persons use extremist and undemocratic methods in order to reach political, ideological or religious goals. This could be in the form of using power, e.g. violence, vandalism, threats or any other type of disturbance of the order of society in order to attempt to influence public issues. Investigations within this field are made on the basis of Section 114c or Section 114d of the Danish Criminal Code.
As is the case with the rest of the Service, the work that is carried out within the Counter Extremism Division is very much of a preventive nature in order to ensure that right or left-wing extremists do not succeed in carrying out attacks, illegal happenings or through mutual confrontations to disturb the public peace and order. The core task of the division is to provide the intelligence-related basis for any plans which, initially, are to be used in connection with the uniformed police-related efforts within the national Danish police (but depending on the circumstances also by foreign police forces).

Characteristic of both right and left-wing extremist circles is the fact that they participate in an international co-operation with other like-minded in connection with demonstrations, happenings et cetera. In that connection, one of the main tasks of the Service is to be instrumental in informing the police in Denmark and abroad about problems linked to the extreme right or left, thus making it possible for the police to adjust its level of preparedness according to the extent of the problems it may face.

Specifically, the division is permanently represented in the weekly security meetings with the Copenhagen Police during which coming potentially “problematic” demonstrations, happenings and fields requiring special efforts et cetera are being discussed. During these meetings, the efforts of the Copenhagen Police are being adapted to the tasks based on PET’s intelligence, thus minimising the waste of resources and at the same time matching the force, which is put into action, to the nature and extent of the task.

In recent years, PET has assisted the national Danish police in a number of cases where there were indications that right or left-wing circles would attempt to e.g. disturb political meetings, harass public figures or carry out other actions that could involve a risk of causing disturbances.

Left-wing extremism
As previously stated, it is the assessment of the Service that the anti-globalisation movement has been without an actual joint, unifying cause for some time. There was, to some extent, reason to believe that parts of the left-wing circles would get together in a joint resistance against the war in Iraq and the Danish participation in it, and a number of demonstrations, happenings et cetera have been carried out in this connection. Furthermore, in connection with the visit of the American President in July 2005 there were several demonstrations and actions with the participation of people from left-wing extremist circles. Still there are no signs that these circles stand more united today compared with what has been seen previously, e.g. prior to the Danish EU Presidency in 2002. It would be more correct to say that there is a number of smaller groups which probably are in
sympathy with each others’ causes but to a still higher degree have their own agenda and only then gather in connection with major events such as e.g. the visit by the American President.

Thus, there have been a number of different demonstrations and actions last year with persons from the extreme left wing acting as initiators and participants. In addition to that, Danish activists have participated in several actions and demonstrations abroad e.g. at the GB Summit in Scotland in July 2005.

There has not been established any significant development in the level of activities on the extreme left wing as a consequence of the Cartoon Case.

One specific case, which must be mentioned, is the situation involving the association “Oprør” (UpRoar) which organised a collection for the benefit of the Palestinian organisation PFLP and the Colombian FARC. Both organisations are on the EU Terror List and this is, therefore, a case involving a possible violation of the provisions in the anti-terror legislation concerning the collection of funds to persons or organisations supporting or carrying out terrorist activities (Section 114a of the Danish Criminal Code). The association leaves the impression – among other things through statements in the press – that this could be a deliberate attempt to challenge and try out the most recent amendments of the terror provisions in the Danish Criminal Code. The Copenhagen Police have investigated the case, but the issue of an indictment has yet to be decided.

Another case, which has been the object of much attention, was the arson attack in June 2005 on the carport at the home of Rikke Hvilshøj, the Minister of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Despite an extensive effort from the Roskilde Police, the case has yet to be solved.

**Right-wing extremism**

In recent years, PET has established an increasing activity level within the right-wing extremist circles and groups that are actively trying to recruit new members. As previously described, there is a certain co-operation between the groups just as they also meet at each others’ events and concerts. Internationally there is also a steady contact between right-wing extremist groups in Denmark and abroad.

Thus in 2005, the annual Rudolf Hess March took place in Kolding, Denmark in which approximately 100 Nazis from e.g. Denmark, Germany and Sweden participated. Normally, the march would have taken place in Wunsiedel, Germany but due to a German ban on demonstrations, it was quickly moved to the Danish side of the border.

Furthermore, it is still PET’s assessment that right-wing extremist groups and persons more or less systematically spread and promote highly racist and insulting messages on the Internet and in other media through posters and flyers. It is also the assessment of the Service that the same groups of persons are behind the regularly occurring intimidation and harassment of individuals of another ethnic origin than Danish. This is also the case as regards people who work for and make positive statements about integration as well as cultural and religious understanding and tolerance.

As mentioned, this development has continued during the past year and particularly the Cartoon Case has meant a further escalation of the level of activity.

Among others, this applies to the organisation Dansk Front (Danish Front) which has reportedly
experienced an increased influx of new members/sympathisers and also a striking increase of its number of activities such as demonstrations et cetera.

It is the overall assessment of the Service that forces on the extreme right wing have used the extremely tense situation related to the Cartoon Case as a platform for advancing their own interests, one of the means being to contribute towards causing a further polarisation in the Danish society. There seems to be a deliberate speculation in the establishment and further development of an antagonistic relationship between the general public and the ethnic minorities. In this connection, it has been established that the way in which the groups use the media to emphasise their viewpoints has become more professional. In continuation of this, there have been examples of an actual “media war” between the extreme right and left with both sides accusing each other of being the violent part.

It is the assessment of the Service that the development mentioned holds the potential for conflict, including the fact that the polarisation of society and marginalisation of ethnic and religious minorities could potentially contribute to further promoting radicalisation trends which in addition could form a growth potential of terrorism.

Counter-espionage

The espionage threat to Denmark and Danish interests has changed concurrently with the general development in Denmark and abroad. The espionage activities that we witnessed during the Cold War no longer exist in the same form. However, it is a fact that foreign intelligence services are still active in Denmark. Counter-espionage, therefore, continues to be an important task for PET. A substantial part of the work within this field includes a long-standing international co-operation with foreign intelligence and security services and this makes special demands on the Service’s knowledge within this field.

Generally, you could say that the interest in carrying out foreign intelligence activities in Denmark has not decreased but today it is concentrated on gathering factual information rather than exercising traditional subversive activities.

As far as Denmark is concerned, PET has established that there is an interest in gathering...
information about defence and security-related matters, Danish politics, economic and social matters in general, but also the opinion of Denmark and other countries concerning the EU and NATO and issues related to the expansion of these organisations have been the object of some interest. Furthermore, technical and scientific research related information is being gathered from various institutions of higher education and from private research facilities.

The foreign intelligence officers typically stay in Denmark under a legal cover such as trade, education, and research etcetera. But diplomatic postings are also used as a cover. This is the reason why visa applications from certain countries are submitted to PET, thus making it possible for the Service – if occasion should arise – to recommend the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the person in question is denied a visa if he/she is a known intelligence officer. Such cases do occur.

The primary daily assignments of the division is to monitor the activities of foreign intelligence officers in Denmark and to counter any possible damaging effects which may be the result of these activities. In addition, contact is often made with individuals whom foreign intelligence officers have tried to cultivate so that the damaging effects can be avoided.

As mentioned above, the sort of information which people may attempt to gather illegally, tends to be of a technical/financial nature and therefore it increasingly assumes the character of industrial espionage but is being carried out by national external intelligence services. As a rule, investigations involving industrial espionage are usually carried out by the general police, but if foreign intelligence services are under suspicion of being involved, it falls within PET’s field of responsibility. If the investigation shows that it concerns a rival company, it could typically imply a violation of the Danish Marketing Practices Act or possibly the Danish Criminal Code and the case will then be investigated by the local police district.

The Service is of assistance to Danish companies with advice and guidance on industrial espionage and on how to better protect themselves, and in September 2003 the Service published a guide on industrial espionage in co-operation with the Confederation of Danish Industries. This guide can be downloaded from the website of the Confederation of Danish Industries www.di.dk.

The preventive effort has a high priority and in 2005 it included, among other things, numerous contacts with companies, institutions and individuals that were presumed to become the target of espionage or have already been targeted by a foreign intelligence service. This work has prevented a number of cases from developing into actual espionage cases.

In addition, PET also prepares official representatives from the police and other public authorities, who are to be posted abroad, on how to counter and avoid exposing themselves as targets of espionage from foreign powers.

**Preventive security and civil protection**

Organisationally, the preventive security functions of the Service are placed under the Division for Preventive Security and Civil Protection. The division was established in connection with the re-structuring of PET in late 2004, as this field was becoming increasingly important to the prevention of e.g. terrorism. The aim was – through a joint and targeted approach to the subject field – to strengthen the external and co-ordinating role of the Service and thus the overall resistance of society.
The division is responsible for different forms of preventive security and issues on vulnerability in relation to critical infrastructure etcetera and problems related to emergency management. Thus, the division offers assistance to both public and private actors in connection with matters concerning society’s overall security and emergency management efforts to the extent it is a matter of protecting public interest.

According to the Prime Minister’s Office Circular No. 204 of 07 December 2001, PET is the national security authority and as such obliged to advise, control and authorise other authorities’ handling of classified information. The task as national security authority includes all security-related aspects, including:

- Physical security (securing buildings, approving doors and locks)
- Document security (securing and handling documents)
- IT security (securing and approving IT systems and programmes)
- Personnel security (background checks of individuals who have a security clearance)

In its capacity as national security authority, PET’s core efforts are aimed at national authorities but as mentioned above, the Service also provides assistance to others on matters concerning the protection of public interest.

The advisory and supervisory efforts are carried out on a general level and co-ordinated between those units of the division that hold specialised knowledge with regard to physical security, document security, IT security, personal security and other specialised fields.

Physical Security
PET offers assistance and advice on matters concerning security to public authorities e.g. ministries, the Danish Parliament, administrative bodies, organisations, companies and individuals as well as to authorities responsible for the running of essential plants and installations where it is a matter of protecting public interest. In addition to this, the Service acts as

"IN RECENT YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASED DEMAND FOR ADVISING ON PHYSICAL SECURITY."
adviser to Danish representations abroad, foreign representations in Denmark, and the estates and castles of the Royal Family. Furthermore, the Service is also responsible for the planning and establishing of security measures at the private homes of certain Members of Parliament, ministers and members of the Royal Family.

In recent years, there has been an increased demand for advising on physical security, particularly in connection with the terror bombings in Madrid and London and following a number of serious threats made against ministers, politicians and other groups and individuals. In the future, PET will therefore continue to give resources for this field high priority.

**IT Security**
As national security authority, PET must monitor and approve the civil authorities’ IT systems that produce, process, communicate or store classified information. Furthermore, the Service is obliged to advise public authorities and private entities on IT security if it is a matter of protecting public interest.

In addition, the IT security section participates in the Service’s international co-operation concerning the protection of information within NATO, Europol and the EU, just as there is a close co-operation with foreign intelligence services on risk and threat assessments within the IT field.

**Personnel security**
PET is also responsible for vetting enquiries of individuals, who are to be cleared for handling classified documents, at the request of various ministries and administrative bodies.

The section Personnel Security carries out background checks on behalf of authorities using security cleared staff members. It is the
authority itself that – based on the background check carried out by Personnel Security – clears the persons in question. However, in cases when a person is to be employed by the police or by private companies working for the police the decision to clear this person is also made by the intelligence service.

In 2005, the following security checks were carried out:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of case</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases related to the Danish Defence</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases related to ministries and other administrative bodies</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases related to the police</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases related to the EU and others</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetting enquiries</td>
<td>15,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updates of records</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enquiries from abroad</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19,226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An additional specific measure, which is to strengthen PET’s effort within the preventive field, is the development of an integrated concept for the inspection of authorities, which means that all relevant security-related aspects are examined in a co-ordinated manner during inspections. Thus, security concepts are developed within the field of physical security in order to ensure a systematic analysis and assessment that will lead to recommendations concerning adapted measures of resistance. There will be a general approach to the servicing of external partners which means that also measures related to personnel security and IT security are co-ordinated in connection with contacts to the individual external partner.

Aviation and Maritime Security
One of the tasks of the Service is to carry out continuous assessments of the security related to civil aviation in Denmark. In this connection, PET co-operates with the civil aviation authorities and airports on the establishment of security measures related to civil aviation.

In recent years, PET has intensified its co-operation with the aviation authorities regarding the civil aviation security in Denmark. Most recently, maritime security has also become a field within which PET is currently assessing the threat against Danish port facilities. In this connection, the Service has a close co-operation with e.g. the Danish Maritime Authority concerning the protection of ports, vessels and shipping companies.

The international co-operation
The international security political situation has emphasised the necessity of an intensified international co-operation between authorities and relevant organisations involved in the fight against international terrorism. Therefore, PET forms part of a wide-ranging international co-operation within an intelligence context. This co-operation is effected through direct bilateral connections with foreign security and intelligence services and participation in international multilateral fora.

First of all, the above co-operation is directed towards western/European services. However, concurrently with the security political development, particularly following 11 September 2001, the Service has extended its contacts considerably to include services outside the group of countries with whom Denmark has traditionally co-operated. In this way, PET is currently co-operating and has established contacts with almost 80 services in approx. 50 countries.

It is crucial to the Service that any exchange of information between relevant security services is effected intensively, directly and in an opera-
tional frame ensuring speed, flexibility and – in consideration of the information often being of a very sensitive nature – an extremely high degree of confidentiality. Exchange and utilisation of this knowledge is necessary to counter the terror threat following 11 September 2001.

The bilateral co-operation
The bilateral co-operation with the services of other countries consists, among other things, of joint operations and specific exchange of information on persons and groups who are likely to pose a threat to Denmark, foreign interests in Denmark or foreign liaisons now or in the future. Furthermore, information of more general and strategic nature is exchanged on different problems connected with terrorism, espionage and extremism just as the services exchange information on new investigative methods, focus areas, technology, education, operational capacities etc.

The multilateral co-operation
The multilateral co-operation mainly takes place within the Bern Club, the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), Middle European Conference (MEC), Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), the EU Terrorism Working Group (TWG) and Europol. PET furthermore contributes to the co-operation within the second EU prong, particularly within Clearing House, COTER and via CTG at the SitCen. Other international co-operations take place particularly within a UN and NATO context and also within a number of weapons control regimes.

In 2005, the Northern intelligence directors initiated a more active/targeted regional co-operation that, among other things, includes an increase in the exchange of analysis reports, capacity surveys, interpreter assistance, and cross-border investigations. The idea is that this co-operation is to result in an agreement/understanding concerning mutual assistance in connection with specific cases or major terror events in the Nordic countries. Furthermore, various projects concerning co-operation within specific areas have been started, including joint training sessions and courses for agent runners.

Other activities
Reports on criminal incidents with potential racial or religious tones (RACI reports)
Since the autumn of 1992, PET has received reports from the police districts regarding criminal incidents that may have a racial background and are directed towards aliens. The scheme was changed in 2001 to include all criminal incidents with a potential racial/religious background irrespective of the incident being directed towards an individual or an interest of foreign or Danish origin.

The object of this reporting scheme is primarily to provide the Service with the possibility of assessing whether there are signs of a more organised and systematic criminal activity emanating from racism and xenophobia. This assessment is made by comparing each reported incident with the rest of the stored information of the Service regarding the specific cases and by comparing the various reported incidents.

37 cases with a potential racist content were registered in 2004. As of 31 December 2005, the number of registered cases was 81.

The reports from 2004 and 2005 have come from many different police districts in Denmark.

However, it is not surprising that most of the reports come from the major Danish cities. In 2004 nine of the reports came from Copenhagen, four from Aarhus, and five from Glostrup. In comparison the numbers from 2005 show
that 20 reports came from Copenhagen, 14 from Aarhus, and four from Glostrup.

As pointed out by the Service in the previous annual report, it is uncertain to what extent these figures account for the actual number of racially motivated criminal offences.

On this background, PET has implemented a number of measures in order to ensure that the scheme offers a picture of the actual extent of these problems which is as true as possible. This means that in the future, the police districts will receive quarterly surveys on the reported cases. The surveys will also contain information on which police districts have made the reports. At the same time the Service continuously publishes the reports – again stating the police districts – on the website www.pet.dk/publikationer.

With regard to initiatives, which are to guarantee that the public is aware that racially motivated harassment, threats, violence and vandalism are to be reported to the police, PET is considering to launch a campaign – in co-operation with the police districts in Denmark – which will bring these issues into focus.

In this connection, the Service is considering the preparation of informative material, e.g. a brochure that draws the attention to offences with a racist or religious background and to the special reporting scheme.

Through its co-operation with representatives from various ethnic minorities in Denmark, PET has received information that several of the representatives from the immigrant forum and the circle of Imams have been exposed to acts of harassment, threats and vandalism with a racist motive et cetera. These fora have also expressed a certain form of resignation with regard to reporting such incidents to the authorities.

In connection with the above co-operation, the Service intends to continue urging the participants to report incidents of this nature to the police just as the above measures will prove instrumental in minimising any possible uncertain figures concerning offences with a racist and/or religious background.

Furthermore, PET has decided to expand the existing reporting scheme to also include criminal acts with a possible political background. The Service is therefore currently revising the regulations from December 2001 concerning the reporting scheme.
Appendices

A. DANISH CRIMINAL CODE
   – SPECIAL CHAPTERS

Chapter 12
Offences against the Independence and Safety of the State

§98
(1) Any person who, by foreign assistance, by the use of force, or by the threat of force, commits an act aimed at bringing the Danish state or any part of it under foreign rule or at detaching any part of the state shall be liable to imprisonment for any period up to life imprisonment.

(2) The same penalty shall also apply to any person who, for the purpose mentioned in Subsection (1) above, organises extensive sabotage, suspension of production or traffic, as well as to any person who partakes in such an act, conscious of its purpose.

§99
(1) Any person who commits an act aimed at involving the Danish state or any allied power in war, enemy occupation or other hostilities, such as blockade or any other coercive measure or who otherwise endeavours to bring about, by foreign assistance, a violation of the independence of the Danish state, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term up to life imprisonment.

(2) For the purpose of this Section and other Sections of Chapters 12 and 13 of this Act, enemy occupation shall mean foreign occupation of any territory of the Danish state, if and so long as it is inflicted on the country by the use of force or by the threat of force.

§100
(1) Any person who by public statements incites enemy action against the Danish state or who brings about an evident danger of such action shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(2) Any person who by public statements incites intervention by a foreign power in the affairs of the Danish state or who brings about an evident danger of such intervention shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding one year.

§101
Any person who, in the face of impending war, enemy occupation or any other hostilities commits an act by which preparations are made for aiding the enemy shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

§102
(1) Any person who, in time of war or enemy occupation, assists the enemy by word or deed or, for the promotion of enemy interests, impairs the military efficiency of the Danish state or any allied power, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

(2) The following acts shall be deemed to be assistance to the enemy:
1) Recruitment for or service in the armed forces of any enemy power at war or in occupation, or in associated military or police forces or in any similar bodies or organisations.
2) Exercise of functions as a civil employee in the police or prison administration of any enemy power at war or in occupation, where such functions include participation in the examination or custody of prisoners.
3) Informing or similar collaboration with any enemy authority or any associated organisation or person bringing about the arrest or risk of arrest or injury of anybody associated.
4) Propaganda for the benefit of any enemy power at war or in occupation, including
activities as publisher; editor or administrative officer of any daily paper, periodical, publishing business or press bureau working for the promotion of enemy interests.

5) Payment of substantial financial assistance to others with a view to promoting propaganda of the nature referred to in No. 4) above or to any party or organisation unduly co-operating with the enemy power at war or in occupation or promoting the interests of such power.

(3) Where informing as under No. 3, Subsection (2) above has taken place under such circumstances that the informer was aware that a person thereby incurred the risk of imminent danger of losing his life, suffering grievous harm to person or health, of being deported or being deprived of his liberty for a long time, or where Sections 245, 246 or 250 of this Act have been contravened with a view to extorting evidence or a confession or otherwise as part of any maltreatment of prisoners, imprisonment for life may be inflicted.

§103

(1) Any person who, in time of war or occupation or imminent danger of such, fails to fulfil a contract relating to measures taken by the Danish state in this connection, or who otherwise contravenes such measures, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

(2) If the failing fulfilment is due to gross negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months.

§104

(1) Any person who, directly or through an intermediary, unduly co-operates for commercial purpose with any enemy power at war or in occupation shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years.

(2) Criminal liability under Subsection (1) above may devolve on any person who has had a position of management in the undertaking concerned. Criminal liability may also devolve on other persons employed in the undertaking when their conduct has been particularly objectionable.

(3) In determining whether and, if so, to what extent the co-operation is deemed to be undue in this sense, account shall be taken not only of the importance of the undertaking to the enemy power at war or in occupation, but also of whether the person concerned

1) had himself taken steps to arrange for the establishment, continuation or extension of any business relations; or

2) in the interest of the enemy at his own initiative has reorganised the undertaking, or has achieved, or attempted to achieve, an increase or acceleration of production above what was necessary; or

3) had called on the assistance of the enemy in his relations with any Danish authority with a view to promoting his own interests; or

4) had prevented or tried to prevent any Danish public authority from obtaining full access to knowledge of the circumstances of the undertaking;

5) had obtained or tried to obtain an excessive profit or any other privileges not reasonably justified in the undertaking.

§105

Any person who, in time of enemy occupation, commits an act aimed at inducing the occupying power or any organisation or person associated with that power to impair the independence of any Danish public authority, or who takes undue advantage of any connection with the occupying power or with any organisation or person associated with that power with a view to obtaining for himself or for others a special privilege,
shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years.

§106
Any person who acts against the interests of the state in carrying out a duty entrusted to him to negotiate or settle, on behalf of the state, any matter with any foreign state, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

§107
(1) Any person who, being in the service of any foreign power or organisation or for the use of persons engaged in such service, inquires into or gives information on matters which, having regard to Danish state or public interests, should be kept secret, shall, whether or not the information is correct, be guilty of espionage and liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

(2) If the information is of the nature indicated in Section 109 of this Act, or if the act is committed in time of war or enemy occupation, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for life.

§108
(1) Any person who, by any act other than those covered by Section 107 of this Act, assists the intelligence service of a foreign state to operate directly or indirectly within the territory of the Danish state shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(2) If the information concerns military affairs or if the act is committed during war or enemy occupation, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years.

§109
(1) Any person who discloses or imparts any information on secret negotiations, deliberations or resolutions of the state or its rights in relation to foreign states, or which has reference to substantial economic interests of a public nature in relation to foreign countries, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years.

(2) If any of these acts has been committed through negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

§110
(1) Any person who forges, destroys or removes any document or any other instrument that is of importance to the safety of the state or to its rights in relation to foreign states shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

(2) If any of these acts has been committed through negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

§110a
(1) Any person who, intentionally or through negligence, without being duly authorised to do so, 1) describes, takes photographs or otherwise depicts Danish military works of defence, depots, units, arms, material etc., which are not accessible to the public, or who copies or publishes such description or depictions, or 2) publishes provisions relating to the mobilisation of Danish forces or other war preparations, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

(2) Any person who, intentionally or through negligence, without being duly authorised to do so, takes photographs from aeroplanes over any territory of the Danish state or publishes such
unlawfully taken photographs, shall be liable to a fine.

§110b
Any person who gives his assistance to any violation of neutrality against the Danish state on the part of any foreign power shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years.

§110c
(1) Any person who contravenes any provisions or prohibitions that may have been provided by law for the protection of state defence or neutrality shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months or, in aggravating circumstances, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

(2) Any person who contravenes any provisions or prohibitions that may have been provided by law for the fulfilment of the state's obligations as a member of the United Nations shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months or, in aggravating circumstances, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four years.

(3) Any person who contravenes any provisions provided by or issued pursuant to regulations adopted under the provisions of Articles 60, 301 or 308 of the Treaty on the European Union and that aims at discontinuing or reducing in whole or in part the financial or economic relations with one or more countries outside the European Union or at similar sanctions towards individuals, groups of individuals or legal persons shall be liable to same punishment as stated in (2).

(4) If any offence is committed as mentioned in (1), (2) or (3) through negligence, such offence shall be punished with a fine or with imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§110d
If any of the offences dealt with in Chapters 25, 26 or 27 of this Act is committed against a foreign sovereign or the head of any foreign diplomatic mission, the penalty may exceed the most severe penalty prescribed for any of the offences by up to one half, unless where the offence is dealt with in chapter 13.

§110e
Any person who openly insults any foreign nation, foreign state, its flag or any other recognised symbol of nationality or the flag of the United Nations or the Council of Europe shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§110f
The offences referred to in this Chapter shall, in all cases, be dealt with by public prosecution, to be instituted by the order of the Minister of Justice.

Chapter 13
Offences against the Constitution and the Supreme Authorities of the State

§111
Any person who commits an act aimed, by foreign assistance, by the use of force, or by the threat of such, at changing the Constitution or making it inoperative shall be liable to imprisonment for any term extending to life imprisonment.

§112
Any person who commits an act directed against the life of the sovereign or of the constitutional regent shall be liable to imprisonment for not less than six years.

§113
(1) Any person who interferes with the safety or independence of the Parliament or otherwise
commits any act aimed, by the use of force or the threat of such, at extorting any resolution from the Parliament or preventing it from freely exercising its activities shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years or, in aggravating circumstances, to life imprisonment.

[2] The same penalty shall apply to any person who similarly interferes with or exercises coercion against the sovereign or against the constitutional regent or against the ministers, the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court.

§ 114

(1) Any person who, by acting with the intent to frighten a population to a serious degree or to unlawfully coerce Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organisation to carry out or omit to carry out an act or to destabilise or destroy a country’s or an international organisation’s fundamental political, constitutional, financial or social structures, commits one or more of the following acts, when the act due to its nature or the context, in which it is committed, can inflict a country or an international organisation serious damage, shall be guilty of terrorism and liable to imprisonment for any term extending to life imprisonment:

1) Homicide pursuant to Section 237 of this Act
2) Gross violence pursuant to Section 245 or Section 246 of this Act
3) Deprivation of liberty pursuant to Section 261 of this Act
4) Impairment of the traffic safety pursuant to Section 184(1) of this Act; unlawful disturbances in the operation of public means of communication et cetera pursuant to Section 193(1) of this Act; or gross damage to property pursuant to Section 291(2) of this Act, if these violations are committed in a way which can expose human lives to danger or cause considerable financial losses.

5) Seizure of transportation means pursuant to Section 183a of this Act.

6) Gross weapons law violations pursuant to Section 192 a of this Act or Law about Weapons and Explosives Section 10(2).

7) Arson pursuant to Section 180 of this Act; explosion; spreading of noxious gasses, flooding, shipwrecking, railway or other traffic-accident pursuant to Section 183(1)-(2) of this Act; health-endangering contamination of the water supply pursuant to Section 186(1) of this Act; health-endangering contamination of products intended for general use etc. pursuant to section 187(1) of this Act.

8) Possession or use et cetera of radioactive substances pursuant to Section 192 b.

(2) Similar punishment shall apply to any person who, with the in Subsection (1) mentioned intent, transports weapons or explosives.

(3) Similar punishment shall further apply to any person who, with the in Subsection (1) mentioned intent, threatens to commit one of the acts mentioned in Subsections (1) and [2].

§ 114a

If one of the acts mentioned in items 1-6 is committed without the act being included in Section 114, the penalty may exceed the highest statutory penalty for the offence by up to half. If the highest statutory penalty for the offence in question is less than four years imprisonment, the penalty may, however, be increased to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

1) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsection (1), 192 a, 193 Subsection (1), 237,

2) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 184 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 260, 261 Subsection (1) or (2), 266 or 291 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (2) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents dated 14 December 1973.

3) Violation of Section 261 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (1) of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages dated 17 December 1979.

4) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 186 Subsection (1), 192 a, 192 b, 237, 244, 245, 246, 260, 266, 276, 278, 279, 279 a, 281, 288, or 291 Subsection (2) when the act is included in Article (7) of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (the IAEA Convention) dated 26 October 1979.

5) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsection (1), 192 a, 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 252 Subsection (1), 260, 266, 288, or 291 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (3) of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation dated 10 March 1988, or Article (2) of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf dated 10 March 1988.

6) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsection (1), 186 Subsection (1), 192 a, 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 266, or 291 Subsection (2) when the act is included in Article (2) of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings dated 15 December 1997.

§114b

Any person who

1) directly or indirectly provides financial support to;

2) directly or indirectly procures or collects means to, or

3) directly or indirectly places money, other assets or financial or other similar means at the disposal of:

a person, a group or an association, which commi t s or intends to commit acts of terrorism as included under Section 114 or 114 a of this Act, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years.

§114c

(1) Any person who recruits another person to commit or advance actions included in Sections 114 or 114 a of this Act or to join a group or association in order to encourage that the group or association commits acts of this nature shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years. Under particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to any term not exceeding sixteen years. It is considered particularly aggravating circumstances especially in cases involving violations of a systematic or organised nature.
[2] Any person who recruits another person to commit or advance actions included in Section 114 b of this Act or to join a group or association in order to encourage the group or association to commit acts of this nature shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§114f
Any person who, by any act other than those included under Sections 114-114e of this Act, participates in or provides significant financial support or other significant support to any corps, group or association, which intends, by use of force, to exert influence on public affairs or give rise to disturbances of the public order, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§114g
Any person who, by any act other than those included under Sections 114-114f of this Act, participates in an illegal military organisation or group, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§114h
Any person who, under aggravating circumstances in contravention of the legislation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction et cetera, 1) exports products with dual use without permission; 2) for the use by the authorities in making decisions about products with dual use gives incorrect or misleading information or suppresses information of significance for the decision in the case; or 3) acts in violation of conditions which are stipulated in the authorities’ decisions about products with dual use, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§115
(1) If any of the offences dealt with in Chapters 25, 26 or 27 of this Act is committed against the
sovereign or against the constitutional regent, then, unless the circumstances are covered by Sections 112 and 113 of this Act, the penalties prescribed in the above Chapters for such an offence are increased up to the double.

(2) If any of the said offences is committed against the Queen, the Queen Dowager or the heir apparent, the penalty may exceed the most severe penalty prescribed for any of the offences by up to one half.

§116
(1) Any person who prevents or attempts to prevent any holding of elections to the Parliament, to the Assembly of the Faeroe Islands or to the municipal or any other public council or authorities, or who corrupts the outcome of any election or renders it impossible to count the votes, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(2) The same penalty shall apply where such acts are committed in connection with a referendum in public affairs, as provided by law.

§117
Any person who, in the case of the elections or referendums referred to in Section 116 of this Act,
1) unlawfully obtains authorisation, for himself or for others, to take part in the voting, or
2) attempts, by unlawful coercion (as described in Section 260 of this Act), by deprivation of liberty or by taking advantage of a position of superiority, to induce some other person to vote in a particular way or to abstain from voting, or
3) causes, by deceit, some other person, against his intention, to abstain from voting or brings it about that such a person’s vote is rendered invalid or that it has an effect different from that intended, or
4) grants, promises or offers any pecuniary advantage with a view to making a person vote in a particular way or abstain from voting, or
5) receives, or demands or accepts the promise of any pecuniary advantage against voting in a particular way or against abstaining from voting, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§118
(1) Any person who, by the use of force or the threat of force or by exploiting a fear of intervention on the part of a foreign power, prevents or attempts to prevent any public authority from freely exercising its activities shall, if the act is committed for the purpose of influencing public affairs or disturbing the public order, be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years.

(2) The same penalty shall apply to any person who, for the purpose indicated in Subsection (1) above and by using the means indicated in that Subsection, gravely impairs freedom of speech or prevents any society or any other association from freely exercising its lawful activities.

(3) The same penalty shall again apply to any person who, for the purpose indicated in Subsection (1) above and by using the means indicated in that Subsection, commits the offence dealt with in Section 193 of this Act or any similar act detrimental to the public good.

§118a
The offences referred to in Sections 111-115 and 118 of this Act shall in all cases be dealt with by public prosecution, to be instituted by the order of the Minister of Justice.
B. LAW NO. 378 OF 6 JULY 1988 ON THE SETTING UP OF A COMMITTEE ON THE DANISH DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, FE, AND THE DANISH SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PET

Law on the setting up of a committee on the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, FE, and the Danish Security Intelligence Service, PET

BE IT KNOWN that the Folketing has enacted and We Margrethe the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of Denmark, have given Our Royal Assent to the following Act:

§1
(1) With the purpose of supervising the Danish defence and police intelligence services, a committee is set up.

(2) The committee shall consist of five members, MPs, appointed by those parties that are members of the Praesidium of the Danish Parliament (Folketing). The committee itself elects its chairman.

(3) Each member of the committee may institute convening a meeting. Discussions in the committee may also take place upon the wish of the Government.

(4) A secretary, who is not a Member of the Folketing, shall be attached to the committee. The secretary shall be permanently employed by the Folketing.

§2
The Government will inform the committee of the guidelines established with regard to the activities of the intelligence services. When informing the committee, consideration will be given to the special circumstances, which apply to intelligence activities.

§3
The committee can, orally or in written form, inform the Government of its opinion of the issues, which are dealt with by the committee.

§4
The financial control of the intelligence services is not included in those matters supervised by the committee. However, in connection with the asking for information from the Government, the committee may be informed of the general guidelines for the finances of the intelligence services.

§5
The committee members and the secretary are bound by confidentiality in respect of the information acquired on the committee.

§6
The law will become effective as of 1 August 1988. Signed at Marselisborg Castle, 6 July 1988.

Given under Our Royal Hand and Seal

MARGRETHE R.

/Erik Ninn-Hansen
C. STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DANISH SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (PET) DATED 9 MAY 1996

I. The objective of PET

The objective of PET is to monitor, prevent and counter undertakings and acts which are presumed to present a threat to the independence and safety of the lawful order of society, including primarily the offences as stated in the Danish Criminal Code Chapter 12 (Offences against the Independence and Safety of the State) and Chapter 13 (Offences against the Constitution and the Supreme Authorities of the State etc.).

II. The organisation of PET

The management and responsibility for carrying out the tasks that the Minister of Justice has assigned to PET rest on the Director of the Service.

The Director of PET is obliged to at any time keeping the Minister of Justice directly informed of all matters of importance to the national security and in general of all matters of major importance to the activities of the Service, including all important single issues and contacts with national as well as international authorities.

III. The tasks of PET

The responsibilities of the Service follow from the above specified objective and comprise primarily the following tasks:

1. Investigation regarding the offences as stipulated in Chapters 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, including hereunder:

   A. Foreign intelligence activities

      Any action that attacks or threatens the safety of the state, as according to Chapter 12 of the Danish Criminal Code, including particularly the illegal intelligence activities of foreign powers or organisations, in accordance with Sections 107 and 108 of the Danish Criminal Code. Investigations in this respect – like in general – must be carried out with all due respect for diplomatic and journalistic activities as well as for legal political enterprise.

   B. Extremism

      The actions of extremist groups that attack or threaten the national safety of the state and the democratic public order or which obstruct or undermine the duties of the democracy, as according to Chapter 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, particularly Section 114.

   C. Terrorism

      Serious crime or the threat of any such serious crime, which – usually with an allegedly political motive – is used as a means of enforcing claims on authorities or private individuals or to bring about disturbances of the public order.

   D. Organised serious crime

      Organised crime that in its gravity of the offence, with its international relations or through its purpose threatens the safety of the state or the public order, or which obstructs or undermines the duties of the democracy, as according to Chapter 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, particularly Sections 114 and 118.

   E. International weapons trade etc.

      Serious cases regarding the violation of the offensive weapons act, particularly when it is feared that the crime is organised.

   F. Proliferation

      Illegal spread of products and technology to be used for weapons production etc., including in particular weapons of mass destruction.
2. **Security advice and counselling**

PET provides advice and counselling to public authorities regarding security issues including computer security. Similar advice and counselling can be rendered to private individuals if it is of public interest to protect.

The advice and counselling includes the planning and implementation of measures to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, infiltration etc., in accordance with particularly the Prime Minister’s Office Circular of 1 November 1986 regarding protection of information of common interest to NATO countries or other information of interest in terms of security and protection.

Upon request from the specific ministry or agency in question, PET carries out vetting inquiries on individuals who require access to classified documents (security clearance). Classified information must only be passed upon an actual assessment of the importance of the information to the vetting inquiry. Cases regarding passing on of derogatory information must be presented to the parliamentary Control Committee regarding the registration and passing of information as in accordance with the specific regulations of 8 June 1964 as laid down for this committee.

3. **Personal protection and other security tasks**

PET currently assesses the security and safety of the Royal Family, the members of Government, leading Danish public individuals and certain foreign visitors (“ViPs”). PET participates in carrying out personal protection tasks as in accordance with specific instructions issued. PET currently assesses the security of the presence in Denmark of foreign diplomatic representations and international organisations and undertakes the contact between these and Danish authorities on security issues.

4. **Aviation security**

PET currently assesses the security and safety of civilian aviation in Denmark and co-operates with aviation authorities and airports on the implementation of security measures in respect of civilian aviation.

IV. **The investigations of PET**

PET shall exercise great caution in applying information obtained, and the correctness of the information must, wherever possible, be verified. Any investigative steps of vital importance, including interference in the secrecy of communication, shall be approved by the Director of PET or in the absence of same by his deputy. Where the specific investigative measure requires a court order, any such approval must be given prior to the case being presented in court as in accordance with the rules of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.

Where investigations lead to charging a person, the Chief Constable of that particular district (in Copenhagen the Commissioner of Police) shall be informed, unless otherwise stipulated by the Minister of Justice. Hereafter, the investigation is carried out under the directions of the local Chief Constable, though in co-operation and with the support of PET.

5. **Registration**

A. The object of the registration

PET gathers and processes information that is, or could be, of importance to the solution of the above-mentioned tasks.
B. Registration of personal data
The registration of personal data shall be limited to the absolute minimum. The registration of Danish nationals cannot be made on grounds of legal political activity only. All cases regarding new files on Danish nationals shall be presented to the parliamentary Control Committee regarding the filing and passing of information.

VI. Co-operation with other authorities
A. Danish authorities
PET shall solve the above-stated tasks in close co-operation with the relevant national authorities, primarily the police force.

B. Foreign authorities
Where necessary, PET co-operates with foreign police, security and intelligence services on solving the above-stated tasks.

VII. Entry into force, etc.
These provisions entering into force immediately shall supersede the Instructions for the Director of PET of 30 November 1953 at the same time repealing the latter instructions.

1 As amended by Circular dated 1 September 1997 and 7 December 2001.

D. THE WAMBERG COMMITTEE’S MANDATE OF 1964

Quote:
Rules applying to the Committee that shall supervise the registration and passing of information of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET).

1. The Committee is set up by the Government, it consists of a chairman and three other members. In the discussions of the Committee, a representative of PET, the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice and of the Ministry of Defence participate. Decisions on matters submitted to the Committee shall only be made by its members.

2. The Committee shall supervise the registration and passing of information of PET.

3. The Committee shall be kept informed about the guidelines for the registration applying at any time.

4. When, acting upon a request from a government agency, PET intends to communicate information concerning individuals, the case shall be submitted to the Committee for approval of the communication. Similarly, submission is conducted, if PET intends to communicate to the government agency such information obtained regarding individuals who have already been approved for dealing with classified issues.

5. In case of parity of votes on the Committee, the Chairman’s vote shall be decisive.

6. Any question regarding items 3 and 4 above may be submitted to the Minister of Justice by the Committee or by any one of its members. Unquote

Footnote
1 In practice, the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice and of the Ministry of Defence as well as the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not participated in the ordinary meetings of the Committee at which meetings, issues are discussed of no fundamental importance.
E. GOVERNMENT DECLARATION OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1968

Quote:
"The Government has today decided that registration of Danish nationals can no longer be made solely on grounds of legal political activity.

The fact that such registrations previously were made often gave rise to discussions under the present as well as the former Government. Naturally, it is a matter of opinion whether such registrations are necessary. In this respect, the security considerations must be balanced against the individual citizen being able to express himself freely.

In principle, it must be recognised that an enterprise which keeps within the limits as laid down by the legislation, should not give rise to registration with the police. Having balanced these opposite considerations, the Government has found it justifiable to abandon registration solely on the basis of legal political activity.

Where previously made registered information of this type still remain, any such information will be destroyed". Unquote

F. THE DANISH ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT

Chapter 66

The Accused and his Counsel for the defence
Section 729a. The accused has the right to choose his own Counsel for the defence, cf. Section 730. A Public Counsel for the defence will be appointed according to the regulations in Sections 731 to 735.

Subsect. 2. The Counsel for the defence will receive duplicates of entries in the court record concerning the matter from the Court. The Counsel for the defence may inform the accused of the duplicates unless anything else follows from Sections 748 and 848. The Court may order the Counsel for the defence not to hand over the duplicates to the accused or to others, if it is feared that the duplicates will be used in an unlawful manner.

Subsect. 3. The Counsel for the defence has access to making himself acquainted with the material obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. To the extent the material can be duplicated without inconvenience, copies must be forwarded to the Counsel for the defence. The Counsel for the defence may not without the consent of the police hand over the received material to the accused or to others. The police gives its consent if it is deemed unobjectionable. With regard to material, covered by Section 877, Subsections 1 and 2, No. 5, consent can only be denied because of the reasons mentioned in Subsection 4.

Subsect. 4. If considerations to foreign powers, the security of the State, the solving of the case, a third
Section 729a. 
At the request of the police the Court may decide to depart from the regulations on the accused and the Counsel of the defence's right of access to documents, according to Sections 729a and 729b, if it is imperative in deference to

1) foreign powers
2) the security of the State
3) the solving of the case
4) the life and health of a third party
5) the investigation of another ongoing case regarding an offence which, according to the law, may be punished with imprisonment for six years or more, or which constitutes an intentional violation of Chapters 12 or 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, render it imperative, the police may order the Counsel for the defence not to hand over the information which he has received from the police. The order can be extended until the accused has given evidence during the trial.

Section 729b. 
An accused without a Counsel for the defence shall upon request be granted access through the police to acquaint himself with any entries in the court record concerning the matter unless anything else follows from Sections 748 and 848. Upon request the police will hand over duplicates of the entries unless it is feared that the duplicates will be used in an unlawful manner.

Subsect. 2. 
Furthermore, an accused without a Counsel for the defence shall upon request be granted access to the material which has been obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. However, the police can refuse the request according to the reasons mentioned in Section 729a, Subsection 4. Restrictions on the right of access to documents of the accused lapse prior to the trial at the latest, or a hearing concerning the handling of the case pursuant to Section 922, or if the case is terminated due to a withdrawal of the charge. Upon request the police will hand over a duplicate of the material to the accused if it is deemed unobjectionable. With regard to material covered by Section 877, Subsections 1 and 2, No. 5, a refusal to hand over the material can only take place according to the reasons mentioned in Section 729a, Subsection 4.
departure is to be applied within a specified time frame, the court order may be extended through a later court order. The decision of the Court may be appealed.

Subsect. 5.
Before the Court makes its decision, a Counsel for the defence must be appointed, and the attorney shall be given the opportunity to make a statement. The attorney is appointed from within the particular circle of attorneys, mentioned in Section 784, Subsection 2. The attorney must be notified of all court hearings, which are held in order to obtain a court order regarding the departure from Sections 729a and 729b, and he is entitled to being present at these and to acquaint himself with the material which has been obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. Section 785, Subsection 1 (item 2-5) and 2 may be applied similarly.

G. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE

Organisation, co-operation and resources of the intelligence services

New centre for anti-terror analysis
1. The Committee recommends that a joint centre for anti-terror analysis be established under the auspices of the Danish Security Intelligence Service. This centre should prepare assessments of threats against the Danish society based on the widest possible basis. Such centre should comprise staff from the various authorities that are vital to the joint Danish authorities’ efforts and activities within the field of terrorism.

Co-operation between the intelligence services
2. The Committee recommends that explicit authorisation be provided under the provisions of the National Defence Act to ensure that the intelligence retrieval of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service directed against matters abroad can also include information about persons who are residing in Denmark.

3. The Committee recommends that specific regulatory framework be provided regarding the exchange of information between the intelligence services, when such passing on of information may affect the handling of the tasks of the services. Thus access should be given to it that information regarding persons residing in Denmark can be exchanged between the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and the Danish Security Intelligence Service without the prior consent of the person in question and without a specific assessment of the implication of each piece of information where such information is related to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other cross-border criminal offences.
4. The Committee recommends that the communication facilities between the intelligence services be extended hence communication shall be possible directly between all the relevant members of staff through secure communication lines [E-mail, telephone, videoconference].

**The internal structure of the National Commissioner’s Office**

5. The Committee recommends that the main part of the Danish National Centre of Investigative Support (abbreviated to NCIS or NEC in Danish) be transferred to the Danish Security Intelligence Service with the aim of strengthening the operational efforts and activities within the field of terrorism. At the same time, the most serious organised crime will be handled by a new and large organisation that will have a more powerful significance than the two present departments.

**Benchmarking the intelligence services**

6. The Committee recommends that a benchmark be carried out regarding the activities of the Danish intelligence services with particular attention on assessing the products work processes, organisation and resource application of the services. Furthermore, the analysis should also include the interface to other authorities. The analysis should be implemented with due respect to the limitations required in order to protect the capabilities, sources and co-operation partners of the intelligence services involved.

**Prioritisation of the intelligence services’ resources**

7. The Committee recommends that a process be prepared according to which a report on the prioritisation of the intelligence services’ resources be presented to the Government Security Committee for approval annually.

**Assistance from the Danish Defence**

8. The Committee recommends that the police requirements for assistance from the Danish Defence, e.g. in connection with the operations of the Special Operations and Response Team, are included to the extent required with regard to the Danish Defence’s acquisition of material.

**Investigation of terrorism**

**PET obtaining and handling information regarding persons**

9. The Committee recommends that as part of the monitoring of certain individuals, authorisation within the terms of the law be provided to the Danish Security Intelligence Service to obtain information from other authorities regarding the persons in question when such passing on of information may affect the handling of the tasks of the service. The passing on of information should include the information that the authority in question already possesses as well as any current passing on of supplementary information regarding the person in question.

10. The Committee recommends that authorisation within the terms of the law be provided to the Danish Security Intelligence Service to obtain information from other authorities that are not associated with persons mentioned by name beforehand when such passing on of information may affect the handling of the tasks of the service.

11. The Committee recommends that it is made possible for information to be submitted electronically (possibly on-line) and in a quite uniform format to ensure that the Danish Security Intelligence Service are saved the trouble of unnecessary and delaying work of converting such information into another format.
12. The Committee recommends that authorisation within the terms of the law be provided to impose on the persons and authorities that have passed on information to the Danish Security Intelligence Service not to inform the specific person whom the information concerns or any third party about the passing on of such information.

13. The Committee recommends that as soon as possible new up-to-date guidelines be prepared for the Danish Security Intelligence Service’s handling of information regarding persons and organisations. It is of vital importance that – to the extent factually required – it is possible to update information of any type in the IT system making such information accessible electronically;
– share information across the Service;
– use the information for solving all relevant tasks and
– keep information for the time appropriate as regards the character of the information.

Handing over flight passenger lists
14. The Committee recommends that authorisation within the terms of the law be provided in the Danish Administration of Justice Act or the Aviation Act for the Danish Security Intelligence Service without prior court order to obtain information regarding passengers from the airlines flying to and from Denmark (including transit stays) as well as domestic flights where such information may affect the handling of the tasks of the service. Such authorisation should include an obligation on the part of the airlines to hand over current and historical passenger lists, just as the airlines should be obligated to store flight passenger lists for a specified period of time. The authorisation should furthermore make it possible to order the airlines – serving specifically selected routes and within a specified period of time or until further notice – to hand over flight passenger lists to the Danish Security Intelligence Service on a continuous basis.

Investigational tools within the field of telecommunications
15. The Committee recommends an amendment of Section 15 in the Act on competitive conditions and consumer interests on the telecommunications market which means that the suppliers of electronic communications networks and services will be obligated to adjust their technical equipment in a manner which makes it possible to carry out an invasion of the secrecy of communication regardless of what technological communication device is being used.

16. The Committee recommends that the technological area, within which it is not immediately possible for the Police to compare user data with the individual communication device (e.g. the combination of pre-paid phone cards and mobile phones or users and Internet cafés), be eliminated or – if this is not possible – reduced as much as possible. The relevant authorities will discuss how this can be done in the most convenient manner.

17. The Committee recommends that requirements must be stipulated in the legislation on telecommunication which will make it possible for Police to obtain real-time telecommunications and sending mast data from all telecommunications suppliers at the same time as this data is registered, i.e. at the same time as an individual makes a call, activates a sending mast etcetera. It should be possible to comply with the obligation by means of out-sourcing.

18. The Committee recommends that requirements are stipulated in the legislation concerning telecommunication which provide the Police with the possibility to obtain historical
telecommunications and sending mast data from all telecommunications suppliers. There is a need for the telecommunications suppliers to be obligated to implement such interceptions immediately and in a manner which guarantees that the aim of the interception is not lost.

19. The Committee recommends that – through Section 786, Subsection 5, of the Danish Administration of Justice Act – suppliers of telecommunications networks and services are directed to establish a twenty-four-hour point of contact so that it will be possible for the Police – at any time and without the aim being lost – to request that the suppliers implement an invasion of the secrecy of communications.

20. The Committee recommends that in order to identify and find suppliers on the telecommunications market, which can be used in connection with the implementation of interceptions, legal requirements must be set up to the effect that – as a prerequisite for running their businesses – suppliers of telecommunications networks and services must be registered with the Danish National Lawful Interception – the Danish National Commissioner of Police.

21. The Committee recommends that – pursuant to Section 786 in the Danish Administration of Justice Act – provisions must be laid down which state that the suppliers of telecommunications networks and services must have specific employees who are responsible for the contact with the Police and who are cleared to handle classified information. Considering the nature of the information, the security clearance must be carried out in accordance with the principles in the Prime Minister's Office Circular No. 204 of 07 December 2001 regarding the protection of information of common interest to countries within NATO, EU or WEU, other classified information, and other information of interest in terms of security and protection.

22. The Committee recommends that following negotiations between the telecommunications suppliers and the Police, it will be made possible for these two parties to communicate electronically via secure systems.

23. The Committee recommends that the suppliers of electronic communications networks in Denmark must have a physical location in Denmark which will make it possible to carry out invasions of the secrecy of communications within Danish jurisdiction.

24. The Committee recommends that through Section 786, Subsection 5, of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, the telecommunications companies will be obligated to use a common format, which has been developed in co-operation with the Police, for the delivery of electronic telecommunications data. This format should be standardised so that there will be no doubt as to which data is included and how it is to be reproduced.

25. The Committee recommends that telecommunications suppliers will be obligated to carry out a continuous update of the relevant telecommunications databases containing information concerning telephone numbers, the correct operator and the user of the number.

26. The Committee recommends that the possibility of a court order on an invasion of the secrecy of communications be directed towards the person and not the means of communication.

27. The Committee recommends that omitting to inform a suspect of an established invasion
of the secrecy of communications be permitted based on consideration for the protection of confidential information on police investigative methods.

28. The Committee recommends that suppliers of telecommunication networks and services will be obliged to pass on information on subscribers without prior approval of a court.

29. The Committee recommends that the necessary powers in the Danish Administration of Justice Act are introduced to allow the police under special circumstances to scan the contents of telephone conversations or other similar communication within a specified area.

29. The Committee recommends that the necessary powers in the Danish Administration of Justice Act are introduced to allow the police under special circumstances to scan the contents of telephone conversations or other similar communication within a specified area.

30. The Committee recommends that suppliers of electronical communication networks and services based on a court order on observation be under an obligation to regularly (continuously) pass on information to the police on the mobile phone masts with which a switched-on mobile phone is connected. Suppliers of electronical communication networks and services should be under an obligation to see to it that the above invasions can be effected in their technical systems as to make possible intrusive treatment mentioned in Chapter 71 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.

31. The Committee recommends that the necessary powers in the Danish Administration of Justice Act are introduced to allow the police in special situations to apply equipment that may interfere with or disconnect radio and telecommunication etc. The Committee assesses that this application should be effected by introducing explicit powers in the Danish Administration of Justice Act and by introducing the necessary changes to the radio and telecommunication regulations. An intervention should only be effected provided a court order can be issued.

Use of human sources and agents

32. The Committee recommends that the Danish Security Intelligence Service to a higher extent than it has previously been the case, as an addition to the covering of expenses or losses, be allowed to pay its human sources for tasks performed on behalf of the Service, including for the personal risk these sources incur in this respect.

CCTV monitoring

33. The Committee recommends that the possibility of an increased and improved CCTV monitoring of public spaces, traffic centres and other places where large crowds of people regularly move or gather be introduced:

• The Committee recommends that the necessary powers be introduced to allow local authorities, with prior police approval, to establish CCTV monitoring of places open to the public in order to prevent crime.

• The Committee also recommends that the police be allowed to suggest that public authorities and private individuals use their possibilities to carry out CCTV monitoring. It should be understood that such suggestions are chiefly used in cases where the CCTV monitoring referred to is of importance to the fight against terrorism.

• Finally, the Committee recommends that it be made possible for the police to order public authorities and private individuals to ensure that already established or planned CCTV monitoring meets a number of specific requirements as to the quality and filing etc. of the recordings.
34. The Committee recommends that the relevant authorities open an intensified investigation of the technological possibilities to establish – at specially selected places – fully or partially automated monitoring functions, including in particular the use of systems able to read biometrical data related to the recognition of specific individuals or behaviour patterns. Such an investigation should include a consideration for the sanctity of private life, data protection etc.

Aliens’ stays in Denmark
Granting residence permit in Denmark
35. The Committee recommends that aliens who through speech, writing or actions have demonstrated a hostile behaviour towards democracy or obstructed basic democratic norms of value should have limited access to Denmark. This should also apply to aliens who do not presently display such behaviour but about whom there is serious reason to fear that they – after having secured a residence permit in Denmark will carry out such activity as mentioned above. In this respect, a provision on students and employees etc. should be introduced in the Aliens Act. As a result of Denmark’s international obligations in cases involving refugees and family reunification, the above provision should not include these groups of individuals.

36. The Committee recommends that aliens who through speech, writing or actions have demonstrated a hostile behaviour towards democracy or obstructed basic democratic norms of value should not automatically be granted a prolongation of an existing residence permit. In this respect, a provision on students and employees etc. should also be introduced in the Aliens Act. As a result of Denmark’s international obligations in cases involving refugees and family reunification, the above provision should not include these groups of individuals.

Religious preachers
37. The Committee recommends that special expulsion rules be introduced and applied against religious preachers hence any preacher whose residence permit is withdrawn pursuant to the special rules will also be expelled with entry prohibition.

The civilian preparedness
The National Operational Staff
38. The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Justice prepare a basis for decision for the Government regarding the establishment of the necessary communication facilities etc. for The National Operational Staff.

Education and exercises
39. The Committee recommends that the education of operational commanders be strengthened as regards the carrying into effect of the intersectorial operational command of the site of damage.

40. The Committee recommends that regional crisis exercises be held every two years as a minimum. Full-scale exercises should also be held to a higher extent in areas that are particularly vulnerable.

Health preparedness
41. The Committee recommends that the Interior and Health Ministry in co-operation with relevant authorities prepare a decision paper for the Government on necessary changes to the health preparedness before 1 March 2006.

Dangerous substance control
42. The Committee recommends that a committee be set up under the Danish Emergency Management Agency with the participation of the Danish Security Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and other relevant authorities in order to carry out
a detailed analysis of the dangerous substance control and in the light of this analysis possibly suggest new or further measures of control. This work should be completed by 1 May 2006.

**Awareness training of national servicemen**

43. The Committee recommends that the awareness training regarding terrorism, which is currently being prepared as a co-operation between the police and the Home Guard, be extended and thus comprise national servicemen in the military and the rescue services.

**EOD team**

44. The Committee recommends that the response time for the EOD team be minimised by extending the duty hours at the work places to include rush hours and also permit relevant personnel to effect emergency driving from their homes to the place of work.

**Communication with the population**

45. The Committee recommends that in a crisis situation regular retrieval of relevant information and decision making with regard to communication to the population is centrally effected in order to ensure an efficient, accurate and reliable communication. The Committee recommends that a model for the central co-ordination of communication with the population and the media be prepared beforehand. This model should be adjustable to a specific case.

**Dialogue with the Muslim societies**

46. The Committee recommends that the fieldwork activities carried out to reach young people and their parents be increased in order to help them understand the requirements and demands of the Danish society. To these efforts may be added an easily understandable brochure written in several languages on “Parent Know How” that will be handed out in malls or comparable places – similar to the way they do it in the UK.

**Efforts directed towards clubs and associations**

47. The Committee recommends that efforts to create sufficient, targeted spare time offers aimed at young immigrants be strengthened hence these are integrated in the Danish society and are not attracted to radical clubs and associations.

**Police efforts**

48. The Committee recommends that the co-operation between the local police and the Muslim societies be strengthened. This co-operation should be supplemented by teachers and social workers, i.e. within the framework of the existing SSP-co-operation.

**Research**

49. The Committee recommends that a strengthening of the research within the field of terrorism be effected, primarily within radicalisation and recruitment. The Committee recommends that funds – approximately 10 million over a 3-year-period – be allocated to strengthen the research within this field to be distributed through the Danish Research Council. The Committee assesses that the concerned ministries and services should be involved in the identification of projects. Furthermore, the services may also contribute to projects with their expertise.
H. SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE ON TERROR ON 2 AND 3 MAY 2005

Dear participants at the Conference “The Roots of Terrorism in Europe”.

As promised at the end of the conference, PET has prepared a summary of the contributions given at the conference. The summary is an attempt to maintain the essence of some of the thoughts, ideas and reflections expressed during the two days of gathering in May 2005. It should therefore not be considered an exact or exclusive account of the contributions and discussions presented at the conference. Once again, I would like to thank you for your participation in and contributions to this conference and I look forward to hosting the next conference.

Lars Findsen
Director General

Summary

On 2nd and 3rd May 2005, the Danish Security Intelligence Service, PET, for the second time in the Service’s history organised and hosted an international conference. The theme of the conference was “The Roots of Terrorism in Europe”. The aim of the conference was to contribute towards increasing the level of knowledge and information concerning the roots or growth potential of terrorism seen in a European context, also applying to Danish conditions. On the basis of the theme of the conference, a number of Danish and international distinguished speakers gave their contributions to the problems and issues concerning Islamic radicalisation and terrorism.

The conference primarily appealed to politicians, police officers, researchers, civil and public servants, Danish and foreign intelligence and security officers as well as journalists and representatives from the Muslim societies in Denmark. The objective of the conference was firstly to gather a circle of persons, who are directly or indirectly involved in the problems and issues concerning Islamic radicalisation and terrorism, secondly to contribute towards establishing, maintaining and extending relations between persons, specific authorities and institutions within this field on the national as well as international level.

It was the main impression that the above objectives were achieved.

It is generally believed that radicalisation is an essential element in the roots of terrorism and it is therefore necessary to gain an insight and knowledge of radicalisation in order to strengthen the preventive efforts within this field. The speakers at the conference contributed with expert knowledge and many problems and issues were discussed and gave rise to productive thoughts and considerations for further activities.

The natural basis of the conference was the development seen in some of the Muslim societies in Europe during recent years. Some Islamic circles seem to have confined themselves and as such established a kind of “parallel societies” to the societies in which they are living. In these circles there seems to be an increasing degree of radicalisation, a trend that is worrying, needless to say.

With a view to providing material for discussion and reflection at the conference and onwards, Director General Lars Findsen opened the conference and presented three questions to the participants:

• Why and when does radicalisation start?
• When is radicalisation expressed?
• How do you consider the possibilities of
fighting the roots of terrorism, when these roots are part of our own society?

In general, the speakers at the conference agreed that time had come to stop thinking that Muslims constitute a homogeneous community dissociating itself from Christian Europeans.

No two Muslims in Europe are identical. Muslims have different preferences; they have different ways of believing and like all others they have different backgrounds. Some are born in Europe others come from various countries and cultures outside Europe. “Muslims are not just Muslims” as one speaker expressed it clearly, but rather “people of Muslim descent”.

It soon became clear at the conference that a Muslim background is not tantamount to an identity solely defined on the basis of religion. Bearing this clear point in mind, a speaker also underscored that the contact to people of a Muslim background should not only be made through their religious leaders, as they are not the only representatives of the Muslim societies. Furthermore, it was emphasised that radicalisation is not an inherent element of Islam – that the Koran is not in itself radical and “the Koran does not read itself” as pointed out by a participant. The introduction also indicated that the theme of the conference was not Islam but on the contrary radicalisation. It was therefore quite crucial to the conference in general that it is the radical interpretations of Islam – as interpreted by human beings – which are worrying. This point of view obtained general support.

The issue of why radicalisation is expressed was a natural central issue in many of the contributions and discussions. Several speakers spoke of how important it is that our democratic society has an obligation to be inclusive in respect of all ethnic groups in society – also ethnic groups of Muslim origin – which are natural parts of all European societies in today’s world.

In a democratic society founded on pluralism, cultural diversity must be tolerated. The strength of any democratic society lies in the diversity itself and the following compromises. During the debate about inclusion, it was also underlined several times that inclusion must be a two-way process. It is not only a question of making the old European societies accept and include ethnic groups of Muslim origin at all levels of society – these groups must also be willing to participate and contribute to society. In this connection it was repeatedly illustrated that participation in European societies of people of Muslim origin by no means require assimilation but only that these persons actively express that they want to become part of the general society.

If faced with exclusion or demands of assimilation, the persons may very well feel alienated and start searching for their own identities. This in turn leads young people into letting themselves be seduced by radical interpretations of Islam that provide simple answers to the complicated matters of life. A speaker drew attention to this issue by stressing that the special Muslim identity, which some young choose, is partly a result of these young people feeling that they do not belong to the world where their parents come from and that they have not been invited into the societies of which they are formally part. They therefore seek alternative identities and then more young apparently choose to join specific Muslim identities that emerge from radical interpretations of Islam. At the same time, they thus signal that they are in sheer opposition to the society which they feel that they are not part of and never will be part of.
In order to avoid this alienation and the problems deriving thereof, several speakers pointed out that it is important to maintain a constant dialogue between all parts of our society. In continuation of what was previously advanced about people of Muslim origin, it was underlined that dialogue with the Muslim circles should not be limited to a dialogue with the religious leaders. If kept as a restricted dialogue, a large part of the Muslim ethnic group, who are not represented by virtue of their religious affiliation, will be neglected.

Actually, all the speakers, each considering it from different angles, focused highly on the dialogue, which is so essential, and a prerequisite of a healthy and safe society. It was clear that the demand for dialogue also meant that in democratic societies there should be no limitations as to what can be discussed and criticised. Obviously it should therefore be legitimate to criticise religious views. The alternative is, as expressed by a speaker, that religion will be elevated and obtain a special status and as such religious leaders will be put above democracy.

On the other hand, it was also made clear that religious views must be legitimate political views which was also one of the conclusions of the 2003 conference “Terrorism – Challenges and Possible Consequences”. At the recent conference, one of the speakers pointed out that when the Islamic groups or movements are included in the political process they would feel more responsible for the development of society and for the problems of the everyday. On the contrary when these persons deliberately are kept beyond influence they are given a platform from where they can spread their messages and recruit supporters always referring to the fact that the society is not interested in people like them. Therefore inclusion is also in this regard a crucial element.

Another speaker brought into focus the fact that people in Europe of Muslim origin need role models; they need persons who, by virtue of their positions, activities etc., can show alternative roads for the Muslims who are looking for an identity. Several role models will contribute towards reducing the alienation and thus increasing the affiliation with the societies in which they live.

The general considerations with regard to countering the conditions, which may lead to radicalisation, are far from being mere abstract reflections. This was made clear when a speaker presented a number of terror cases in which persons from Europe were involved. Several motivational factors applied to the persons who had been radicalised voluntarily and later on been recruited to local terrorist cells. The social conditions for the individual, including the group to which the person in question belonged, often played a significant role. The feeling of being left out, of not belonging, had among other things made these people look for alternative roads.

Radicalisation has, however, also other motivational factors as clearly expressed at the conference in general but also from the cases presented. Particularly global conditions play an important role which several speakers indicated. Several international conflicts apparently contribute towards radicalising the Muslims in Europe who were neither born nor grew up in the areas where the conflicts are. For example it was mentioned that al-Qaida has regularly been legitimising its point of views and actions on the basis of the experienced injustices committed against Muslims in e.g. the Israel/Palestine conflict and Iraq. A solution of these conflicts alone will not eliminate the terror problems but will most likely contribute to eliminating the appeal of the terrorist groups as it will become much more difficult for them to
legitimise their point of views and particularly their acts.

The overall message from the speakers at the conference was that the causes and solutions to the problems concerning radicalisation are three-dimensional with regard to a personal, a group-related and a global dimension. None of the speakers gave the impression that there are easy solutions to the problems of radicalisation, however, it was clear that a lot of actions could be taken at the national as well as European levels. Such efforts and activities would also contribute towards dampening the effect of the global motivational factors.

As expressed by one of the speakers very forthrightly: people in harmony don’t become terrorists.

Another issue which might have surprised a little at the conference was that non-violent groups should not be neglected as being unimportant, rather on the contrary. Non-violent groups can contribute to radicalising and verbally legitimising terrorist acts. If not directly, then indirectly. Non-violent groups that at first glance seem harmless may, as expressed by a speaker, on this basis turn out to be some of the most dangerous kinds. The groups contribute to fertilising the grounds for further radicalisation and ultimately recruitment for terrorism purposes. It is therefore very essential to be particularly attentive of these trends.

In this connection it was once again highlighted that dialogue with moderate Islamists and a high degree of involvement of people of Muslim origin may contribute towards putting a damper on the impact which the more extremist non-violent groups may exert.

In conclusion, the conference brought out many relevant points and issues into the light. In the future these points and issues will contribute to balance and inspire the discussions about and the initiatives to be taken against the roots of terrorism within the sphere of the security services as well as in the rest of society.
I. PET BENCHMARKING

Summary

1. Background and introduction

1.1 The Cross-Ministerial Committee on Fighting Terrorism recommended in October 2005 that the Danish Security Service (Politiets Efterretningsstjeneste (PET)) should be benchmarked to assess the quality and relevance of its products, work processes and organisation. The benchmarking review was undertaken in the first quarter of 2006 by the Deputy Director General of the British Security Service (MI5).

2. Approach to the review

2.1 The judgements of the review are based on material provided by PET, interviews of PET staff, and discussion with officials in Danish Government Departments, Agencies and the Police and with industry.

3. The nature and scale of the threat to Danish national security

3.1 Since 2001 the terrorist threat to Western interests has increased, reinforced by military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. The ‘cartoon crisis’ has raised Denmark’s profile in Islamic countries. Whilst no terrorist attacks have occurred in Denmark over the period, there is clear evidence of the existence in Denmark of groups and individuals sympathetic to terrorism. Other national security threats come from left and right wing extremism, espionage and proliferation of technology to support Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme.

4. Responsibilities and organisation

4.1 PET is an integral part of the Danish Police, but responsible to the Ministry of Justice for its national security role in investigating and preventing threats to Danish national security.

4.2 PET has grown in capacity and capability since 2001 and will grow further in 2006 with the creation of a multi-agency Centre for Terrorism Analysis (Center for Terroranalys) under PET auspices and the incorporation of parts of the Police Centre for Investigation Support (Rigspolitiets Nationale Efterforskningsstøttecenter (NEC)).

5. Vision and planning

5.1 PET has largely achieved the Vision established in 2003. It must now renew its Vision and strategic plans looking forward at least three years. These plans must be linked firmly to resources and endorsed interdepartmentally.

5.2 PET is facing major challenges as it grows and changes. It must continue to apply formal change management and project disciplines in key areas to ensure it gets full benefit from its increasing resources and internal changes.

6. Investigation and threat reduction

6.1 PET takes an imaginative and disciplined approach to its work to pursue intelligence leads and to investigate threats from terrorism and other sources, and has brought in new skills to add to its analytical capability. Its casework is effective. PET is working imaginatively with other parts of the Police and in its contacts in the community to improve its understanding of the causes of radicalisation and violence, and to
improve the prospects of early warning of new sources of threat.

6.2 The planned creation of the CTA is an important step towards improving overall understanding of terrorist threats and behaviours, and providing a better service of threat analysis and assessment for government and others. Critical to the CTA’s success are the commitment of the main partners, responsiveness to the needs of customers, effective means of communication and improvements in open source capability.

6.3 Understanding between PET and other parts of the Police of the handling of intelligence aspects of cases that may come to trial is not as strong as it should be. There is a risk that the incorporation of elements of the NEC into PET will blur roles and accountabilities between PET and the police. These points need to be addressed.

7. Protective security and vulnerability reduction

7.1 PET is the National Security Authority for physical, document, IT and personnel security and provides advice to government and others. This area of PET’s work needs to continue to grow in size, skills and knowledge.

7.2 PET provides personal protection officers to protect leading figures in Denmark. This group of officers is highly motivated and effective, but stretched.

7.3 PET is accountable for the quality of its advice and the professional standards of its services but there is a need for government to take the responsibility for the overall balance of risk judgements.

8. Intelligence collection

8.1 PET’s capabilities in this area are of a very high order. The additional NEC resources will bring some further capacity and resilience. There is a need to plan ahead to maintain interception capability as technology changes.

9. Resources, people and skills

9.1 PET is largely financed as part of the National Police. Whilst total costs can be estimated the costs of individual activities are not known. This makes it difficult to judge whether resources are used efficiently. PET needs greater certainty of future funding and better understanding of its costs to underpin efficient management of its resources.

9.2 The commitment and professionalism of PET staff is impressive. PET needs to continue to bring in new and different skills to complement the skills and experience of its police officers. It should invest more substantially in training.

10. Information management

10.1 PET has a pressing need to update and improve its IT to support better its counter-terrorist work. Whilst it requires some interoperability with the police, PET’s information and IT requirements are otherwise very different and cannot be met by police systems or resources. PET has made good progress in establishing its requirements. But the proposed programme needs to be de-risked and delivered progressively. PET should consider outsourcing key parts of the IT development whilst retaining firm overall control.
11. Relationships

11.1 PET works closely with the National Commissioner’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and other partners. The creation of the CTA should add to a growing sense of interdepartmental and interagency focus on terrorism.

11.2 The relationship with the Forsvarets Efterringstjeneste (FE) on counterterrorism requires continuing attention including exchanges of staff.

12. Conclusions

12.1 There are strong grounds for pride in PET and its national security capability and effectiveness. It has strong leadership and dedicated staff. But it faces substantial further challenges in its daily work and its continuing organisational development. Additional funding may be necessary, and some further recruitment of specialists.

12.2 PET’s position in the National Police brings benefits but also drawbacks. PET’s accountability is to the Ministry of Justice for its operations and performance, but to the National Commissioner for its administration and resources. PET needs greater freedom to develop capabilities separately from the police where necessary for its national security work.

12.3 There is a need for greater clarity in the ownership of risk, and more explicit interdepartmental endorsement of judgements of the balance of priorities, resources and risks.

12.4 PET’s operational agility, its proactive and open approach, and the broad range of its counter-terrorist intelligence capabilities place it amongst the most capable in Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1
PET should undertake an immediate review of its Vision and its Strategic Plan looking at least three years ahead. The Strategic Plan should be revised and reviewed annually, and should be endorsed, together with the high level resourcing plan by the Government Security Committee.

Recommendation 2
PET should review its arrangements for corporate performance management and ensure the continuing application of systematic processes to the management of key change programme and projects.

Recommendation 3
PET should agree guidance with the National Police for the handling of prosecution cases involving or based on intelligence work. This should be supported by training and exercises.

Recommendation 4
The Government Security Committee should require annually a report on the state of physical, document, IT and personnel security in departments and ensure that responsibilities and accountabilities are fully understood.

Recommendation 5
The Government Security Committee should assure itself when reviewing priorities for resources that adequate provision is made for protective security work in PET.

Recommendation 6
Arrangements should be agreed to keep under review interdepartmentally the risks of key figures in Denmark and the appropriate level of security arrangements.
Recommendation 7
Targets for the allocation of surveillance effort between national security and serious crime work should be reviewed and agreed as part of the annual review of priorities and resources by the Government Security Committee.

Recommendation 8
The Ministry of Justice should assure itself of the adequacy of existing interception systems and that sufficient thought and planning is being applied to the maintenance of interception capability in Denmark for national security investigation purposes in the face of rapid technological development in communications.

Recommendation 9
PET and Forsvarets Efterringstjeneste (FE) should actively pursue their proposals for the interchange of staff in support of counter-terrorist work.

Recommendation 10
PET should develop a longer term and more strategic approach to the acquisition and development of the skills that it needs, and increase its investment in the training of its staff.

Recommendation 11
PET should focus its IT renewal to deliver capabilities progressively and in shorter time. Additional funds will be necessary. PET should consider outsourced services for development, project management and delivery whilst maintaining overall its own firm control of the project.

Recommendation 12
There should be a thorough review in conjunction with the Wamberg Committee (or successor oversight arrangements) to consider how best to protect individual rights whilst making more effective and efficient use of IT.